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ARTICLES
THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE POLICE POWER
Randy E. Barnett*
The conservation of private rights is attained by the imposition of a
wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such a restraint as will pre-
vent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of them
.... The power of the government to impose this restraint is called
Police Power.1
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to identifying the powers of the federal govern-
ment, we know where to look. Article I of the Constitution provides a
list. The debate is, and has always been, how to interpret the meaning
of these provisions and how broadly or narrowly to construe that
meaning. When it comes to the power of states over their people, the
issue has always been shrouded in doubt. For, though the Constitu-
tion provides a list of specific limitations on state powers along with an
enumeration of certain rights, it does not provide any written list of
state powers or even a general statement as to their scope. In short
the Constitution is, or at least to some appears to be, all but silent on
the question of the proper scope of what is called the police power of
states.
This apparent silence has invited a fundamental choice between
two ways of construing the scope of state power. Some have con-
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to
Kate McFarland for her research assistance. This Article expands upon and revises
material that will appear in RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPrION OF LIBERTY (forthcoming 2004). Permission to photocopy for
classroom use is hereby granted.
1 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 1-2
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tended that the state, being a government of "general powers," may
do all that is not expressly prohibited by the express provisions of the
Constitution. Others contend that, because governments with unlim-
ited power are a form of tyranny, some limits to the powers of states
must be identified.
One response to this is that state governments are limited, but
only by their own state constitutions. Of course, these are not the only
limits on state powers. Everyone concedes that even powers author-
ized by state constitutions are limited by the express prohibitions on
state powers in Article I as well as the restrictions imposed by the Bill
of Rights. So the claim is that, except where limited by the federal Constitu-
tion, states' powers are limited only by their constitutions. This begs
the question of whether any additional restrictions are imposed on
the states by the Constitution and, as we shall see, there are-in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In this Article, I will contend that the Constitution is not really
silent at all on the proper scope of state powers; that the original
meaning of what the Constitution says requires that state powers over
their citizens have fairly easy to identify limits-though as with most
constitutional provisions, applying these limits to particular cases re-
quires judgment and is not a matter of strict deductive logic. This
account will require me to briefly review the method of interpretation
I advocate-original meaning originalism-and its limits. These lim-
its require that interpretation of original meaning be implemented by
means of constitutional constructions that enhance the legitimacy of
the Constitution without violating the original meaning established by
interpretation. I then examine the original meaning of the provision
that provides the limit on state power: the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally I offer the construction of the scope of the police power of
states that is consistent with that limitation: the police power of states
includes the power to prohibit wrongful and to regulate rightful con-
duct of individuals. 2
Throughout this Article, it is wise to be aware of an irony lurking
behind debates among legal scholars on the proper scope of the po-
lice power of states. These powers are unwritten and, as a result, lack
all specificity associated with the rule of law. In response to this, some
2 I say "includes" because the police power may have other aspects as well, in
particular, a more extensive power to regulate or rtstrict the use of state owned prop-
erty. But this is an aspect of state power I will not be addressing here. I am con-
cerned instead with the general power the state has over its citizens, wholly apart from
the powers it may exercise as a property owner in its own right. Where these two
issues overlap to some extent is the state's power to regulate behavior in public places,
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks.
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argue that the powers are for most intents and purposes unlimited,
meaning that state legislature have the power to enact what they will,
free of any constitutional constraints imposed by the federal judiciary.
In contrast, as I shall show, both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments provide an express recognition of unenumerated rights, privi-
leges or immunities retained by the people, while the Tenth
Amendment expressly states that the powers not delegated to the fed-
eral government are reserved to the states or to the people-without
specifying which.
Confronted with this text, however, many of the very same schol-
ars object that because the content of these rights are unwritten or
unspecified, these textual provisions should generally be ignored and
forgotten (as well they have been). The objection is that recognizing
unwritten rights provides no rule-like constraints on the powers of
judges to strike down legislation. But they are not similarly bothered
by giving a blank check to legislatures in the form of an unlimited
construction of their entirely unwritten police power. The irony of
this approach is that unwritten powers become unlimited, in contrast
to unenumerated rights expressly recognized by the Constitution, which are
made to vanish.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
Every discussion of the meaning of the Constitution should begin
with the writer identifying his or her method of interpretation. Even
if that method cannot be defended completely in the particular con-
text, an author should provide some indication of the reasons for the
adoption of the particular chosen method. Too many discussions of
the Constitution lack what should be this obligatory preface, leaving
the reader unable fully to assess the particular interpretation being
offered.3
I have argued elsewhere that a written constitution should be in-
terpreted according to its original meaning; that we are not bound by
the original intention of its framers, but only by the original meaning
of the words they enacted (though evidence of intention may tell us
something about what the words meant to a member of the general
public at the time of enactment). The justification of this approach,
in the United States, stems from two features of the Constitution: (1)
3 To be clear, my claim concerning the need to identify one's interpretive meth-
odology is limited to writings that advocate a particular interpretation or oppose an-
other. This need not be done if the treatment is for some other purpose, such as a
purely historical discussion or an analysis of cases in which no interpretation of the
Constitution itself is advocated.
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that one of its principal purposes is to constrain those who make and
enforce laws so as to protect the rights retained by the people, and for
this reason, (2) it is put in writing.
Because this is the law governing lawmaking, those who make the
laws that are to govern the people should not be able to change the
laws that govern them. Putting these laws over the lawmakers in writ-
ing serves to lock them in, and this "lock in" function would be de-
feated if those who make or enforce laws, or who interpret the writing,
are free on their own to change it to something different that they
prefer. In short, for a written constitution to perform the principal
function for which it is put in the form of a writing, its meaning must
remain the same until it is properly changed. And it is improper for it
to be changed by the very people it is supposed to bind.
By this rationale, the original meaning of the text is to be pre-
served, but not because its authors have any authority over the living.
It is to be preserved because the system of lawmaking we currently
have has a structural feature-the written limitation of the power of
lawmakers. The vital function of this feature would be destroyed, to
the detriment of the rights retained by those alive today, if the mean-
ing of the writing can be changed by those whom it is supposed to
constrain. Originalism is justified, therefore, as an essential means of
protecting the rights retained by the people.
While the original meaning of the text might be demonstrably
inconsistent with a multitude of possible outcomes, however, it may
still not provide enough guidance to identify a single rule of law to
apply to a particular case at hand. Indeed, it frequently will not.
When this occurs, it becomes necessary to adopt a "construction" of
the text that is consistent with its original meaning but not deducible
from it.
For example, as we shall see, the original meaning of the text
calls for the protection of the natural liberty rights retained by the
people along with any additional privileges or immunities created by
the Constitution itself. In contrast, the text provides no explicit refer-
ence to the proper scope of state powers. It most assuredly does not
say that the states have all powers not delegated to the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment is expressly noncommittal on
the scope of state powers when it affirms that "[t] he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
''4
Any claim concerning the proper scope of state power is, there-
fore, a construction, rather than an interpretation of the text. This is
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
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not to disparage it, as constitutional construction is inevitable. It is
only that a constitutional construction is not a product of interpreta-
tion based on original meaning, except indirectly, when the original
meaning of what the text does say is consistent with one construction,
and inconsistent with another.
This is the case with the police power. We shall see that the un-
limited or plenary power construction of the police power is inconsis-
tent with both the text and original meaning of the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In contrast, the construction I shall offer,
which is not original to me, is consistent with these express provisions.
In addition, when choosing among possible constructions of the
text that are consistent with its original meaning, we should choose
that construction which enhances the legitimacy of the Constitution,
by which I mean its ability to create a lawmaking process that binds in
conscience or to create a duty of obedience in the citizenry. I have
defended this conception of constitutional legitimacy elsewhere. 5 By
violating the rights retained by the people, the unlimited or plenary
power construction of the state police power undermines rather than
enhances the ability of constitutional lawmaking processes to produce
laws that bind the people in conscience. In contrast, the construction
I will propose respects the rights retained by the people and enhances
constitutional legitimacy in the relevant sense.
II. INTERPRETING WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS: THE ORIGINAL
MEANING OF THE NINTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
Before the Civil War, unless a state law violated one of the ex-
pressed prohibitions in the Constitution, it could not be challenged in
federal court. In 1833, the Supreme Court, in Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more,6 held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal govern-
ment and did not constrain the states (notwithstanding that the text
of some of the first ten amendments contains no such limitation).
Thus, at the founding period and for decades thereafter, the propri-
ety of state laws received minimal federal scrutiny.
7
Upon passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the con-
stitutional structure changed. States were now prohibited from
5 See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003).
6 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
7 Though, as will be noted below, state court judges began to scrutinize the pro-
priety of state legislation under the "law of the land" provisions in state constitutions
to ensure that such legislation served the general public, as opposed to a faction or
special interest. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 45-60 (1993).
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abridging any of the "privileges or immunities" of their citizens-a
phrase that, as we will see, included the background natural rights of
the people along with other rights and privileges of citizenship ex-
pressly created by the Constitution. In addition, states could not de-
prive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or
deny them the equal protection of the laws. Federal courts were now
required to assess whether states had violated any of these
prohibitions.
Owing to the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, state govern-
ments no longer can claim a plenary power to restrict the liberties of
the people subject only to their constitutions and any express restric-
tions in the original Constitution. Instead, any state abridgment of
the privileges or immunities should be subject to challenge in federal
court. When state legislatures restrict the liberties of the people, they
are no more entitled to be the judge in their own case than is Con-
gress. The exercise of liberty by the citizen should not be restricted
unless the state can show, to the satisfaction of an independent tribu-
nal of justice, that such a restriction is both necessary and proper.
Determining the propriety of state laws is more problematic than
with federal powers, however, because there is no list of enumerated
powers the original meaning of which can be used to distinguish
proper from improper exercises of power. Indeed, there is nothing in
the Constitution that speaks to the issue of the proper scope of state
powers. While the Tenth Amendment establishes that federal powers
are limited to those that are enumerated, it does not say whether any
particular power is in the hands of the states or of the people. As
Justice Thomas has correctly observed, "[w] ith this careful last phrase,
the Amendment avoids taking any position on the division of power
between the state governments and the people of the States ... ", To
answer that question we must look elsewhere.
Originally, the obvious places to look were state constitutions to
see what powers a particular state had been granted.9 However, as was
already mentioned, the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
complicated this by forbidding states from improperly abridging the
privileges or immunities of their own citizens even where permitted by
their constitutions. In determining the proper scope of state power,
then, it becomes necessary to establish the original meaning of this
8 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
9 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is up to the people of each State to deter-
mine which 'reserved' powers their state government may exercise.").
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restriction. A state may only exercise whatever degree of power is con-
sistent with these express restrictions.
Because the evidence shows the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was, in part, a reference to natural rights, its proper interpretation
requires an appreciation of what is meant by natural rights. This in
turn requires that we begin our investigation into that textual injunc-
tion in the original Constitution that protected unenumerated natural
rights from federal power: the Ninth Amendment.
A. The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment
1. The Reason for the Ninth Amendment: The Equal Protection of
Unenumerated Rights
The Ninth Amendment' ° was the creation of James Madison.
Both his reason for devising it and his use of the amendment in con-
stitutional argument support the most obvious textual meaning:
unenumerated liberties are to be treated the same as those that were
enumerated. To the degree that enumerated rights receive protec-
tion from Congress, so too should those that were left unenumerated.
To appreciate this, we need to begin by understanding the problem
that the Ninth Amendment was enacted to solve.
Until the Bill of Rights was adopted two years after the ratification
of the Constitution, with a few exceptions, all of the rights retained by
the people were unenumerated. There was no explicit protection for
the rights of free speech and assembly or the rights of freedom of
religion and of the press. During this period no one argued that the
federal government had the power to abridge or deny these and other
unenumerated liberties. In the absence of explicit mention in the
Constitution, how were these rights to be protected?
The most obvious way was by the political constraints of federal-
ism and separation of powers, which required a convergence of opin-
ions before laws could be enacted and enforced. Their protection
also came from the fact that the powers of Congress were limited and
enumerated. Even when Congress was ostensibly acting within its
powers, however, the means it chose to employ might still be unneces-
sary or improper. Finally, the judiciary was to be the guardian of the
Constitution when Congress exceeded its powers, including its law-
making power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 1 Taken to-
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
11 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003).
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gether, these structural and textual constraints prevented whole
categories of rights violations without having to discuss the rights
themselves and contributed importantly to the legitimacy of the origi-
nal Constitution.
When the opponents of the Constitution objected to the absence
of a bill of rights, the Federalists argued that this additional protection
was unnecessary because the Congress was not given any power to vio-
late the rights retained by the people. "Why, for instance," asked
Hamilton, "should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be im-
posed?"1 2 As I shall discuss at greater length below, the Federalists
also argued that adding a bill of rights would be dangerous because
the rights or liberties of the people were unenumerable and any rights
that would be omitted would be rendered insecure.
Despite their arguments, the Federalists were forced to promise a
bill of rights to obtain enough support for ratification. When James
Madison sought to honor this commitment in the first Congress, he
was faced with solving the difficulty that he and his Federalist allies
had noted just two years earlier. As soon as any particular rights or
liberties were explicitly enumerated, the status of those left out of the
enumeration became unclear. Were only the enumerated rights to be
protected and the unenumerated rights left unprotected? By "unpro-
tected" I mean subject to being surrendered up to Congress to be
abridged or denied at its sole discretion.
Here is how Madison stated the problem when he introduced his
proposed amendments to the House:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerat-
ing particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage
those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not sin-
gled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the Gen-
eral Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of
the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but I conceive, that it
may be guarded against. 13
Madison then referred the members to the portion of his propo-
sal that read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
13 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as ac-
tual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.
14
Eventually, all of Madison's proposals were referred to a select
committee of the House, which decided to list the amendments after
the body of the original Constitution rather than insert them within
the text. From this committee emerged the current text of the Ninth
Amendment, which replaced the "diminish the just importance" lan-
guage with the stronger phrase "deny or disparage." While there is
much that is controversial about the Ninth Amendment, this story of
its origin and enactment is not.
What do Madison's original proposal, and his explanation of it,
add to our understanding of the Ninth Amendment? First of all,
Madison's placement of this provision is revealing. He put it at the
end of the list of specific individual rights that he proposed be in-
serted in Article 1, Section 9, immediately after the two individual
rights already listed there-the rights of habeas corpus and the rights
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws-but before the other
prohibitions of government power listed in Section 9 that are not eas-
ily conceived as individual rights, such as the prohibition on granting
titles of nobility. This supports a conclusion that it refers to the same
sorts of individual rights that were explicitly enumerated in the Con-
stitution and that it was to be accorded the same importance as the
other provisions in that section.
Then there are the words of the original proposal that were
quoted above, which convey information about the nature of both
enumerated and unenumerated rights omitted from the otherwise
stronger final version. Owing to his tendency to run parallel ideas to-
gether in a single sentence, Madison's original proposal is a bit diffi-
cult to follow. When disentangled, however, it shows clearly that the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights were of at least two kinds.
First were those enumerated rights that provided additional or
"actual limitations" on the delegated powers beyond those that previ-
ously existed. For example, prior to its amendment, the Constitution
did not require jury trials in civil cases. In his speech to the House,
Madison categorized these actual limitations as "positive rights" and
gave the example of trial byjury.15 Second were those rights that were
14 1 id. at 435.
15 1 id. at 436. For this item, Madison's notes read: "4. positive rights resultg. as
trial byjury." Madison's Notes for Amendments Speech 1789, in I THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY
THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 64 (Randy E. Bar-
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enumerated "merely for greater caution." As Madison explained,
these refer to "those rights which are retained when particular powers
are given up to be exercised by the Legislature."' 6 Crucially, in his
handwritten notes to this speech, Madison refers to these "rights
which are retained" as "natural rights" and gives as an example of such
a natural right the freedom of speech.
17
Thus, according to how Madison used the term "retained" rights,
we know that the "other" unenumerated rights "retained by the peo-
ple" mentioned in the Ninth Amendment fall into the second cate-
gory of his original proposal. They are the natural rights "which are
retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the
Legislature."' 8 A few of these rights were included in the Bill of
Rights "for greater caution" but most were left unenumerated. They
were not left textually unprotected, however. The textual source of
that protection was, initially, the limited powers scheme and the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, 19 and soon thereafter the enumeration of
certain rights coupled with the Ninth Amendment for the others.
Madison's speech to the House also clarifies how constitutional
rights, whether enumerated or unenumerated, relate to the delegated
powers. Constitutional rights can limit both the ends of government
as well as the means by which the legitimate ends of government are
executed. As Madison explained (in another sentence combining
parallel ideas), "the great object in view is to limit and qualify the pow-
ers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases
in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particu-
lar mode."20 Disentangling this passage, we find that ends constraints
"limit... the powers of Government" by specifying when "the Govern-
ment ought not to act." Means constraints "qualify the powers of Govern-
ment" by specifying when "Government ought . . . to act only in a
particular mode."
nett ed., 1989) [hereinafter RIGHTS RETAINED]. The next type of rights mentioned
both in his speech as delivered and in his notes are
positive rights, which may result from the nature of the compact. Trial by
jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a
social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is as essen-
tial to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of
nature.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
16 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
17 Madison's notes read: "Contents of Bill of Rhts.... 3. natural rights retained as
speach." Madison's Notes for Amendments Speech 1789, supra note 15, at 64.
18 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
19 See generally Barnett, supra note 11.
20 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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As an example of improper means, Madison offered the use of
general warrants: "The General Government has a right to pass all
laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for en-
forcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may
not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose... ?"21
As Madison's example suggests, the Necessary and Proper Clause ex-
acerbates the means-end problem within a scheme of delegated pow-
ers. Authorizing the Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof' 22
heightens the prospect that Congress or some department or officer
of the general government may pursue a delegated enumerated end
by means that infringe upon the rights retained by the people. There-
fore, some regulation of the means employed to achieve enumerated
governmental ends must supplement the device of enumerating
powers.
In his speech, Madison explicitly linked the abuse of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause with the need for constitutional rights to con-
strain the means chosen by the general government:
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed,
they are directed to particular objects; but even if Government
keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain ex-
tent,... because in the Constitution of the United States, there is a
clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers
vested in the Government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof .... 23
As the Supreme Court stated in Dennis v. United States,2 4 "[t]he ques-
tion with which we are concerned here is not whether Congress has
such power, but whether the means which it has employed conflict with the
First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution."25
In addition to placing actual or additional limits on the means by
which government can accomplish its legitimate ends, Madison identi-
fied a second power-constraining function of constitutional rights:
21 1 id. at 438.
22 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
23 1 ANNALS OF CONG 438 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
24 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
25 Id. at 501 (emphasis added); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
112 (1959) ("Congress ... must exercise its powers subject to the ... relevant limita-
tions of the Bill of Rights.").
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constitutional rights provide a "redundant" or cautionary safeguard in
the event that delegated powers of government are given an overly
expansive interpretation. Constitutional rights can help hold govern-
ment to its legitimate enumerated ends in two ways. Rights can pre-
vent the adoption of an expansive interpretation of enumerated
powers in the first instance. Failing this, once a power has been expan-
sively interpreted, the direct judicial protection of enumerated and
unenumerated rights holds government within some limits.
Madison himself used the Ninth Amendment to check an expan-
sive construction of delegated powers during the debate over the con-
stitutionality of the national bank. Near the end of his speech in
which he argued that the powers to incorporate a bank and grant it a
monopoly were beyond those granted to Congress under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, he observed: "The latitude of interpretation re-
quired by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the
Constitution itself."26 As one authority for this "rule" of interpreta-
tion, Madison cited the Ninth Amendment:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at
least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude
now contended for .... He read several of the articles proposed,
remarking particularly on the l1th [the Ninth Amendment] and
12th [the Tenth Amendment]; the former, as guarding against a lati-
tude of interpretation; the latter, as excluding every source of power
not within the Constitution itself.
27
Thus, Madison viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as play-
ing distinct roles. Madison viewed the Tenth Amendment as authority
for the rule that Congress could exercise only a delegated power. For
example, Congress could not establish a post office or raise and sup-
port armies without a delegation of power to pursue these ends. 28 In
26 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (1791) (emphasis added).
27 2 id. at 1901 (emphasis added). The numbering of the amendments changed
because the first two amendments proposed by Congress were not ratified by the
states. So what came to be called the First Amendment was originally the third
amendment on the list submitted to the states. At the time Madison spoke, however,
this outcome was not yet known. One of these two moribund proposals-which regu-
lated congressional pay increases-became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1992
when it was finally ratified by a sufficient number of states.
28 The Tenth Amendment is redundant of the list of enumerated powers coupled
with the first sentence of Article I, which begins: "All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 (em-
phasis added). For this reason, whereas Madison highlighted the importance of the
Ninth Amendment in his Bill of Rights speech, he viewed the Tenth Amendment as
largely superfluous: "Perhaps other. words may define this more precisely than the
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contrast, Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as providing author-
ity for a rule against the loose construction of these powers-espe-
cially the Necessary and Proper Clause-when legislation affected the
rights retained by the people. As Madison concluded in his bank
speech: "In fine, if the power were in the Constitution, the immediate
exercise of it cannot be essential; if not there, the exercise of it involves the
guilt of usurpation. ... 9
Three years later, in 1794, Madison would again argue in Con-
gress that the unenumerated rights retained by the people directly
constrained congressional power. When Congress sought to censure
the activities of certain self-created societies for their participation in
the Whiskey Rebellion earlier that year, Madison contended that
"[w]hen the people have formed a Constitution, they retain those
rights which they have not expressly delegated."3 0 Here Madison was
asserting that the unenumerated retained right to hold opinions con-
strained the power of Congress to issue a censure, in the same manner
as "the liberty of speech, and of the press."3 1 Indeed, "the censorial
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Govern-
ment over the people."32 Strong words on behalf of supporters of
insurrection.
Madison's uses of the Ninth Amendment show that, like the natu-
ral rights that were enumerated, the unenumerated rights retained by
the people provide a twofold check on government power. Their exis-
tence argues against a latitudinarian interpretation of enumerated
powers when those powers are used to restrict the liberties of the peo-
ple; and the direct protection of the liberties of the people also effec-
tively limits both the ends of government and the means by which
these ends can legitimately be pursued. This from the man who de-
vised the Ninth Amendment.
In his treatise on the Constitution, St. George Tucker, the editor
of the American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries and one of the
leading jurists and constitutional scholars of the founding era, offered
a similar interpretation of the Ninth Amendment (while it was still
referred to as the Eleventh Amendment). He began his explanation
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments by connecting them with the
enumeration of powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause. He
whole of the instrument now does. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but
there can be no harm in making such a declaration .... I" 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
29 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1902 (1791) (emphasis added).
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noted that "[a]ll the powers of the federal government," were "either
expressly enumerated, or necessary and proper to the execution of
some enumerated power."3 3 He then described, as "one of the rules
of construction which sound reason has adopted" the principle "that,
as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so
enumeration weakens it, in cases not enumerated. ' '34 This meant that,
because the powers of government are enumerated, the inference
from the text is that government is to have no powers beyond those
expressly provided.
Tucker then offered a rule of construction that follows from this
inference:
[I] t follows, as a regular consequence, that every power which con-
cerns the right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it
may operate to infringe or impair his liberty; and liberally, and for
his benefit, where it may operate to his security and happiness, the
avowed object of the constitution .... 35
Tucker shared with Madison the view that the Ninth Amendment
provided an argument against a latitudinarian interpretation of the
delegated powers, but he also made even clearer that the end of con-
stitutional construction is the protection of individual liberty: both a
"strict construction" of powers and "liberal construction" of rights.
Tucker was proposing something very much like what I call a "Pre-
sumption of Liberty."
36
2. The Rights "Retained by the People" Are Natural Liberty Rights
So the rights retained by the people are to be treated on a par
with those that are enumerated. What exactly are these unenumer-
ated rights? I have already referred to them as "natural rights." The
founding generation universally believed that laws should not violate
the inherent or "natural" rights of those to whom they are directed.
This is not to say that universal agreement existed about the precise
content of these rights, though I believe there was considerable con-
sensus about such rights in the abstract. Nor did everyone agree about
the remedy that was appropriate for their violation. Still, the basic
33 St. George Tucker, Of the Constitution of the United States, in I BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA app. at 307-08 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch
& Abraham Small 1803).
34 Id. at 308.
35 Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
36 See BARNETT, supra note * (manuscript at 253-69, on file with author).
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concept of natural rights was clear: Natural or inherent rights are the
rights persons have independent of those they are granted by govern-
ment and by which the justice or propriety of governmental com-
mands are to bejudged. That the founding generation's commitment
to natural rights is expressed in the Ninth Amendment's reference to
"rights retained by the people" is overwhelming.
Let us begin with James Madison's speech to the House introduc-
ing his proposed amendments, including the provision that eventually
became the Ninth Amendment. When explaining to the House the
nature of the various rights contained in the amendments he was pro-
posing, Madison stated that "[i] n [some] instances, they specify those
rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be
exercised by the Legislature. ' 37 Madison's notes for this part of his
speech read: "[c]ontents of Bill of Rhts.... 3. natural rights retained
as speach.1138 In other words, for Madison even some of the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, such as the freedom of speech, were
natural "retained" rights.
Additional evidence that the term "retained" rights referred to
natural rights can be found in the deliberations of the select commit-
tee that the House of Representatives appointed to draft amendments
to the Constitution and on which Madison served. A draft bill of
rights authored by fellow select committee member Representative
Roger Sherman was found in the 1980s among Madison's papers.
Sherman's second amendment read as follows:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them
when they enter into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in
matters of religion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happi-
ness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments
with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their
common good, and of applying to Government by petition or re-
monstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they
Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united States.
3 9
Along the same lines, Madison proposed to Congress that the fol-
lowing be added as a prefix to the Constitution, " [ t] hat Government is
instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people;
which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of
37 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added).
38 See Madison's Notes for Amendments Speech 1789, supra note 15, at 64.
39 Roger Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 15, at
351 (emphasis added).
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acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and ob-
taining happiness and safety.
40
Indeed, the evidence both that the founding generation was com-
mitted to natural rights, and that this commitment is reflected in the
words of the Ninth Amendment, is so overwhelming that few deny it.
Instead, the argument is sometimes made that the only natural rights
that may be protected by courts are those that were specifically enu-
merated in the Constitution. For the moment, however, I wish to ex-
amine why the Framers did not include a complete list of natural
rights in the Constitution. The simple reason is that they thought it
would be impossible to do so. Understanding why will help to illumi-
nate the nature of the rights "retained by the people."
When opponents to the proposed constitution objected that it
lacked a bill of rights, defenders argued vociferously that any effort to
enumerate rights would be dangerous because the rights of the peo-
ple were literally boundless. James Wilson, a member of the Constitu-
tional Convention and the first professor of law at the University of
Pennsylvania, was an ardent adherent of natural rights. In his lectures
on jurisprudence delivered between 1790 and 1792, he explicitly re-
jected the views of both Edmund Burke and William Blackstone and
contended instead that "[g]overnment, in my humble opinion,
should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural
rights of its members; and every government, which has not this in
view, as its principal object, is not a government of the legitimate
kind."'4 1 Nor for Wilson were these mere "theoretical" or "philosophi-
cal" rights with no real bite:
I go farther; and now proceed to show, that in peculiar instances, in
which those rights can receive neither protection nor reparation
from civil government, they are, notwithstanding its institution, enti-
tled still to that defence, and to those methods of recovery, which
are justified and demanded in a state of nature. The defence of
one's self, justly called the primary law of nature, is not, nor can it
be abrogated by any regulation of municipal law.
42
Nevertheless, when defending the Constitution against those who
complained about the absence of a bill of rights, Wilson explained,
40 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-34 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
41 JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORS OF JAMES
WILSON 296, 307 Uames DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896).
42 Id. at 335 (citations omitted). Wilson's lectures also undermine the claim that
by the time of the Constitution, Americans had lost their Lockean and revolutionary
ardor for natural fights in favor of a more conservative Blackstonian positivism that
favored legislative supremacy.
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"there are very few who understand the whole of these rights."43
None of the classical natural rights theorists, he said, claim to provide
"a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men
and as citizens .... Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sir,
that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted such
a thing."' 44 And before the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wil-
son observed:
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be
particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution
is an enumeration of the powers reserved, If we attempt an enumer-
ation, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given.
The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all
implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of
the people would be rendered incomplete.
4 5
The same argument was made by Charles Pinckney in the South
Carolina House of Representatives:
[W]e had no bill of rights inserted in our Constitution: for, as we
might perhaps have omitted the enumeration of some of our rights,
it might hereafter be said we had delegated to the general govern-
ment a power to take away such of our rights as we had not
enumerated . ... 46
Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell stated a similar argu-
ment to the North Carolina ratification convention: "Let any one
make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will imme-
diately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it."
4 7
To today's ears, this statement is startling. No matter how long a
list of rights anyone might write, Iredell claimed he could add twenty
or thirty more. What conception of rights could possibly lead some-
one of Iredell's stature to make such a claim in so visible a forum?
What conception of rights would lead a natural rights theorist like
Wilson to deny that anyone in the Constitutional Convention would
have presumed to enumerate all the rights retained by the people?
And how could people with so expansive a view of rights, and who
43 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (onathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1836) 454
[hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
44 2 id.
45 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388
(MerrilJensen ed., 1976).
46 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 316.
47 4 id. at 167 (quoting James Iredell at the North Carolina ratification conven-
tion, July 29, 1788).
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viewed them as so vitally important, have eventually adopted so short a
list as those contained in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights?
One clue is to be found in the examples of natural "retained"
rights provided by Roger Sherman in his proposed second amend-
ment: "rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring prop-
erty, and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and
publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably
assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to Govern-
ment by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances." Each of
the rights on Sherman's list-which was not intended to be exhaus-
tive ("such are")-are liberties or freedoms to believe or act in certain
ways. They are not positive claims on government or on others.
The claim that natural rights are unenumerable and dangerous
to enumerate makes complete sense if the term "inherent rights" or
"natural rights" is used as a kind of synonym for "liberties" or Liberty
(as distinct from license). That the term "natural rights" was synony-
mous with "liberties" is also exemplified in the official letter to Con-
gress by the members of the Constitutional Convention who wrote
that "[i] ndividuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty
to preserve the rest .... It is at all times difficult to draw with preci-
sion the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and
those Which may be reserved .... -48 Other direct evidence of the
interchangeability of (natural) rights and liberties could be
produced. 4
9
According to this conception, natural rights define a private do-
main within which persons may do as they please, provided their con-
duct does not encroach upon the rightful domain of others. As long
as their actions remain within this rightful domain, other persons-
including persons calling themselves government officials-should
not interfere without a compelling justification. Because people have
a right to do whatever they please within the boundaries defined by
natural rights, this means that the rights retained by the people are
limited only by their imagination and could never be completely spec-
ified or enumerated.
48 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
627 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840) (emphasis added). I shall return to this quota-
tion and its reference to "surrendered" rights in the next section of this Article.
49 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 201-02 (citing speech of Oliver
Wolcott to the Connecticut ratifying convention,Jan. 18, 1788, discussing whether the
proposed constitution "secures the liberties of the people, or whether its tendency be
unfavorable to the rights of a free people"). 2 id. at 311 ("What is government itself
but a restraint upon the natural rights of the people? What constitution was ever de-
vised that did not operate as a restraint on their original liberties?") (emphasis added).
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This conception of rights as open-ended liberties is illustrated by
an exchange that occurred during the debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives over the wording of what eventually became part of the First
Amendment. At one juncture in the debate, Representative Theodore
Sedgwick criticized the select committee's inclusion of the right of as-
sembly on the grounds that "it is a self-evident, unalienable right
which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be
called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to de-
scend to such minutia . ,,50 Representative Egbert Benson replied
to Sedgwick that "[t] he committee who framed this report proceeded
on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they con-
ceived them to be inherent; and all they meant to provide against was
their being infringed by the Government."
5 1
Sedgwick's response to Benson is revealing of the conception of
rights held generally at the time:
[I]f the committee were governed by that general principle, they
might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they
might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat
if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed
when he thought proper .*...52
Notice that Sedgwick was not denying that one did indeed have a nat-
ural right to wear one's hat or go to bed when one pleased. To the
contrary, he equated these "inherent" rights with the right of assem-
bly, which he characterized as "self-evident" and "unalienable."53
Indeed, Representative John Page's reply to Sedgwick both made
this equation of liberty rights explicit and showed that there was no
disagreement that "inherent" or natural rights was a reference to an
open-ended liberty.
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a
man has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before
the face of authority; people have also been prevented from assem-
bling together on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to guard
against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the
declaration of rights.
54
Note too the use of the term "privilege."
50 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
51 1 id. at 731-32.
52 1 id. at 732.
53 1 id. at 731.
54 1 id. (statement of John Page).
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Sedgwick's point was that the Constitution should not be clut-
tered with a potentially endless list of trifling rights55 that "would
never be called in[to] question '5 6 and were not "intended to be in-
fringed. '57 Sedgwick's argument implicitly assumes that the "self-evi-
dent, unalienable," and inherent liberty rights retained by the people
are unnumerable because the human imagination is limitless. All the
actions one might take with what is rightfully his or hers can never be
specified or reduced to a list. It includes the right to wear a hat, to get
up when one pleases and go to bed when one thinks proper, to
scratch one's nose when it itches (and even when it doesn't), to eat
steak when one has a taste for it, or take a sip of Diet Mountain Dew
when one is thirsty. Make any list of liberty rights you care to and one
can always add twenty or thirty more.
The problem, therefore, with any explicit protection of these lib-
erties is that the liberty of the people can never be completely enu-
merated or listed. An enumeration of rights is likely to be taken as
evidence that the people surrendered up to the general government
any liberty that is not on the list. With the inevitable danger created
by any limited enumeration of unlimited rights specifically in mind,
James Madison devised what became the Ninth Amendment.
That Madison and Sherman spoke of "retained" rights and that
this word is used in the Constitution also supports the view that natu-
ral rights are liberty rights. For these are rights that people possess
before they form a government and therefore retain; they are not the
"positive" rights created by government. To be clear, I am not claim-
ing that all constitutional rights are liberty rights. On the contrary,
there are unquestionably positive rights created by the Constitution,
and by other laws, and enforceable duties to respect these rights that
government owes its citizens. I am claiming only that the natural
"rights . . .retained by the people" to which the Ninth Amendment
refers are liberty rights.
B. Did the People "Surrender" Their Natural Liberty Rights?
Because the evidence of the founding generation's widespread
commitment to natural rights is undeniable, some point to statements
saying that people give up some of their natural rights when they
enter into society and form a government. They also point to laws that
restricted freedom as evidence that natural rights were not thought to
55 For a discussion of the founding generation's view of "trivial" rights, see Philip
A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1994).
56 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
57 1 id. at 732.
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impose any legal or enforceable constraints on government. Some-
times it is claimed that the professed commitment to natural rights
was rhetoric to justify a revolution, but when it came to governance,
this rhetoric was muted or abandoned entirely.
There is no question that the Founders sometimes spoke of sur-
rendering one's natural rights. They also enacted laws that some,
then and now, might think violated natural rights. If, however, we
approach these statements and practices with the same sympathy for
natural rights that was felt by the founding generation we may find
that they are reconcilable with a strong commitment to the liberty
rights retained by the people. This account of natural rights will also
be crucial to understanding how the Fourteenth Amendment could
protect the liberty rights of citizens without giving the federal govern-
ment complete control over matters ordinarily regulated by state law.
Let us begin with statements saying that one gives up one's natu-
ral rights when one enters into society or when one forms a govern-
ment. Such statements were surely common. "What is government
itself but a restraint upon the natural rights of the people?" 58 rhetori-
cally asked a member of the New York ratification convention. "What
constitution was ever devised that did not operate as a restraint on
their original liberties?" 59 Robert Barnwell asserted to the South Caro-
lina ratification convention that "in the compacts which unite men
into society, it always is necessary to give up a part of our natural rights
to secure the remainder .... -60
Sometimes these statements may even mean what they appear to
say. Then, as now, there is not complete unanimity on any issue if we
move beyond abstractions and generalities. But for every statement to
this effect there are many more that refer to the natural rights still
possessed by the people. This is significant because, when these state-
ments were made, popular governments existed and citizens were not
thought to be in a state of nature.61
58 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 311. Notice, too, that this statement also
equates "natural rights" with liberty.
59 2 id.
60 4 id. at 295 (statement of Robert Barnwell at the South Carolina convention,
Jan. 17, 1788).
61 For the founding generation, the "state of nature" described the relationship
between two or more persons who lack an established, common legal authority. See
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 326 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690) (" [W] here-ever any two Men are, who have no standing Rule, and
common judge to Appeal to on Earth for the determination of Controversies of Right
betwixt them, there they are still in the state of Nature, and under all the inconve-
niences of it."). Therefore, because they were subject to no common law and subject
to no common magistrate, princes or heads of state might still be considered in a state
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Typical is the statement by the ratification convention of Virginia
that formally accompanied its ratification of the Constitution-a state-
ment also copied and adopted by the ratification conventions of
North Carolina and Rhode Island: "That there are certain natural
rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot de-
prive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."6 2 To
make sense of natural rights we should not use the aforementioned
sorts of statements to discredit statements like these. Rather, we
should appeal to a conception of natural rights that reconciles them
both; and there is more than one way to reconcile them.
1. Surrendering Only a Portion of Our Natural Rights
First, most references to giving up one's natural rights when en-
tering into society say, as does Barnwell's, that one surrenders only "a
part of our natural rights" 63 while retaining others. Only those rights
whose alienation is necessary to form a government are yielded. Typi-
cal of this idea is the official letter to Congress by the members of the
Constitutional Convention (which I cited earlier to illustrate how the
word "rights" was synonymous with the word "liberty"):
64
It is obviously impracticable in the foederal [sic] government of
these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each,
and yet provide for the interest and safety of all-Individuals enter-
ing into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The
magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and
circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times diffi-
cult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be
surrendered, and those which may be reserved .... 
65
What supposedly follows from statements about surrendering nat-
ural rights is that, despite the fact they are devised to constrain gov-
ernments, natural rights no longer appear to operate as an effective
of nature with respect to each other. Furthermore, Locke contended that absolute
monarchs "however intitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you please, is as much in
the state of Nature, with all under his Dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind." Id.
62 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 657 (recounting George Wythe's June
27, 1788 oral report listing the amendments to be considered for the proposed consti-
tution). Notice how the draft bill of rights by Roger Sherman mirrors this statement
except for the use by Sherman of the word "retained," which links this sort of state-
ment to the rights "retained by the people" in the Ninth Amendment.
63 4 id. at 295 (emphasis added).
64 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65 MADISON, supra note 48, at 627 (emphasis added).
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constraint on government. This conclusion is unwarranted. At the
time of the Founding, almost no one claimed or believed that one
surrenders all one's natural rights up to government, but only those
that were necessary. One cannot infer, then, from the fact that some
natural rights were surrendered up, that other rights still retained by
the people can be denied or disparaged with impunity.
Rather, the rights that are retained remain the measure of
whether government is acting properly or improperly in the exercise
of its delegated powers. As Madison explained to the Constitutional
Convention, though the national government was formed to accom-
plish a variety of objects or ends, first among them was "the necessity
of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the
steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils
which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this
convention.
'66
2. Exchanging Natural for Civil Rights
As will be discussed at greater length below, the most important
power surrendered to government is what John Locke and others
called "the executive power" and what is sometimes called the "police
power." This is the power to enforce or "police" one's rights when
they have been violated by others. Indeed, Locke argued that it was
the "inconvenience" of exercising the executive power in the state of
nature thatjustified the creation of an "impartial magistrate"-that is,
government.
The particular problem with individuals retaining the executive
power is that they are then the judges in their own cases.
I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the
Inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must certainly be
Great, where Men may be Judges in their own Case, since 'tis easily
to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an
Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.
6 7
When "surrendering" one's executive power to government, how-
ever, one receives in return a "civil" right to have one's retained lib-
erty rights protected by the police power now in the hands of the civil
government. This civil right to "the protection of the laws" is the root
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
66 Id. at 76.
67 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 276.
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mandates that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
68
Thus, in return for the surrendered natural right of enforcement,
government assumes a positive obligation to protect the unsur-
rendered rights retained by the people. Those retained rights remain
a measure of the propriety of government enforcement, since it is for
their protection that the executive power is surrendered in the first
instance. As Locke explained:
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property
without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the
end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it
necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Prop-
erty, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entring
into Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too
gross an absurdity for any Man to own .... Hence it is a mistake to
think, that the Supreme or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth,
can do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrar-
ily, or take any part of them at pleasure.
69
But even this account of exchanging natural for civil rights un-
derestimates the role played by natural rights after persons enter into
civil society.
3. The Agency Theory of Government
To understand better how delegated governmental powers can
be squared with retained rights, those seeking historical context must
also take into account the law governing agency relationships or what
is still sometimes referred to as the law of "master and servant."70 The
Founders were accomplished private lawyers, familiar with eighteenth
century agency law and, not coincidentally, they'also often professed
their belief in the "agency theory" of government. The idea that gov-
ernment officials are the agents or servants and the people are the
principals or masters, however quaint it may seem to political sophisti-
cates today, was widely held. Benjamin Franklin articulated this popu-
68 U.S CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Govern-
ment: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
69 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 360-61.
70 The rhetoric of "master/servant" is today limited to doctrines governing em-
ployer-employee relationships and primarily for when employers are liable for the
tortious acts of their employees, as opposed to when agents may bind their principals
to contracts. See HAROLD GILL REuSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 102 (2d ed. 1990) ("[A] servant is one who works physically
for another, subject to the control of that other who is called a master.").
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lar view to the Constitutional Convention: "In free Governments the
rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns."
7
1
By definition, a principal "surrenders" certain powers to her
agent. If I designate you my agent to sell my car, you now are in pos-
session of the power to sell, which formerly only I possessed. It is even
possible that I delegate my exclusive power to sell the car to you and
that, by the terms of our agreement, I no longer may rightfully sell the
car to a third party. Think of authors who routinely give an exclusive
license to a publisher to publish an article or book, which the author
may then not republish on his or her own.
Yet, just because certain powers (or rights) are delegated does
not entail that the agent is now the master. For, according to agency
law, the agent is to exercise those powers only (1) "on behalf of' and
(2) "subject to the control of' the master or principal. 72 Of course,
the principal does not literally control the behavior of the agent-
there would be no advantage to entering into a principal-agent rela-
tionship were that the case. Instead, the agent must yield to the con-
trol of the principal when the principal exerts it. And even when
operating on his own, the agent must always exercise the powers dele-
gated to him "on behalf' of the interests of the principal and can be
held responsible for any breach of this fiduciary duty.
It would be more accurate and much neater if we were to speak
not of rights delegated to government but only of powers. Unfortu-
nately, language then, as now, is not always used with precision.
Though it must be admitted that statements can be found that speak
of alienated "rights" when "powers" would have been the better term,
one thing is remarkable: The Framers of the Constitution were rigor-
ously consistent in referring to the "powers" of government and to the
"rights" of the people. The Constitution refers to powers-and only
powers-being delegated to government, whereas rights are retained
by the people (and powers reserved to them as well). The best theory
of this usage is that only powers, not rights, are delegated to govern-
ment and that all rights are retained by the people as a measure of the
propriety of the exercise of governmental power.
4. Regulating the Exercise of Inalienable Rights
Then there is the matter of "inalienable" rights, that is, rights that
cannot be surrendered. How can this concept be squared with state-
ments about surrendering natural rights and the enactment of free-
71 MADISON, supra note 48, at 371 (statement of Benjamin Franklin).
72 For a general overview of agency law, see Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed
Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987).
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dom-constraining laws? One way to understand this is to think of
inalienable rights as somehow more fundamental or important than
other trivial or trifling natural rights, and then posit that, while the
latter can be surrendered and restricted, the former cannot. How-
ever, this formulation is misleading.
It is better to say that inalienable rights are more abstract than
other specific natural rights or liberties. These inalienable abstract
rights can be classified as the rights of several property, freedom of
contract, self-defense, first possession, and restitution. 73 Together,
these rights define a boundary or jurisdictional space within which
people should be free to make their own choices.
The specific choices people make within this jurisdictional space
are the more particular "natural" rights or liberties. For example, the
abstract and inalienable right to the possession, use, and enjoyment of
several property includes the particular right to read a book in one's
own house or to go to bed when one wishes, though such specific
"trivial" rights are impossible to list and may themselves be alienated.
Moreover, my inalienable property rights to the exclusive use and en-
joyment of my body do not prevent me from waiving this right by con-
senting to get in the ring with Muhammad Ali.
It is common to see statements to the effect that one's right to do
something is subject to the "laws of the land." For example, while
Locke argued that one completely surrendered the executive power
to enforce one's rights by punishing one's attacker or extracting repa-
rations from him, he contended that one "gives up" the natural right
of self-preservation "to be regulated by Laws made by the Society, so far
forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society shall
require."7
4
Such statements raise the issue of the reasonable regulation of
one's natural rights. Assume that there is a natural and inalienable
right to possess, use, and dispose of several property. Suppose that
someone wants to transfer her property rights in a tract of land to her
son after her death so she executes a document called a "will." How
this document will be interpreted and enforced in a court of law re-
quires the articulation of certain rules or laws governing what consti-
tutes a valid will. Requirements of formality, for example, may be
devised specifying the need for two or more witnesses to a signature.
Such rules or laws regularize will-making. The power to regulate will-
73 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTIY: JUSTICE AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1998) (defending these as the principal abstract natural rights because
they address the pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest, and power).
74 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 352 (emphasis added).
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making in this sense does not, however, include the power to rewrite
wills to contradict the demonstrable intent of the testator, nor the
power to prohibit the making of wills altogether, nor the power to
confiscate a percentage of the decedent's property in estate "taxes."
That the reasonable regulation of natural rights is essential to
their efficacious exercise and enforcement in civil society does not en-
tail that these rights are surrendered completely to the government.
On the contrary, these rights remain the object and measure of any
regulations. That is, the protection and facilitation of everyone's re-
tained rights in civil society is the purpose of any "police" regulation
by law, and this object or end is the measure of whether a particular
regulation is or is not reasonable.
By this account, some natural rights can be surrendered to gov-
ernment in order to better secure those that are retained. As was said
by Samuel Nasson, at the Massachusetts ratification convention:
"When I give up any of my natural rights, it is for the security of the
rest."75 But it is better to adopt the terminology of the Constitution
itself and speak of (limited) powers being delegated by the people-
or principals or masters-to their servants or agents in government.
The rights that are retained provide the measure of how these powers
should be exercised. The "police power" to enforce or regulate a re-
tained right is not the power to confiscate, prohibit, infringe, or
abridge its exercise.
Locke made a similar point when he claimed that whatever lib-
erty or powers are given up when one enters society are given up
only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself
his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be supposed
to change his condition with the intention to be worse) the power
of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be sup-
pos'd to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to secure
every ones Property by providing against [the] ... defects . .. that
made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie.
76
It is also worth noting that Locke distinguished the two powers
that were given up, either entirely (the executive power) or to be reg-
ulated by law (the power of self-preservation), from a third species of
natural rights that he does not claim a person surrenders either upon
entering civil society or upon forming a government. This third spe-
75 2 EIOT's DEBATES, supra note 43, at 134 (statement by Samuel Nasson at the
Massachusetts convention, Feb. 1, 1788).
76 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 353.
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cies is "the liberty he has of innocent Delights. '77 Provided that such
pleasures do not unjustly interfere with the rights of others, the civil
authority has no role in the prohibition or even the regulation of "in-
nocent Delights."
Few who caution us against taking the Founders' expressed com-
mitment to natural rights out of context address the views of those
who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if their commitment to
natural rights was more "liberal" and less "republican" than the Foun-
ders', it is they-not the Founders-who wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment. When we consider the protections of "privileges or im-
munities" provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is their concep-
tion-not the Founders'-that represents the original meaning of
that phrase.
C. The Original Meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
The conception of natural rights as liberty rights that may some-
times be regulated but not abolished was not abandoned after the
founding period. It was held, perhaps even to a greater degree, by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recall John Page's reference
to "privilege" in his discussion of the right of peaceable assembly that
became part of the First Amendment. 78 The terms "rights," "liberties,"
"privileges," and "immunities" were often used interchangeably or in a
cluster. This terminology is reflected in what is known as the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in the
wake of the Civil War: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States .... "79
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and to prevent future Con-
gresses from reneging on its guarantees.8 0 The bill provided federal
protections against infringement by state governments of the rights
"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property."81
77 Id. at 352 ("For in the State of Nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent
Delights, a Man has two Powers.").
78 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80 See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71-91 (1986) (outlining the congressional debates on
the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment).
81 See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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As Michael Kent Curtis has shown, "privileges or immunities" was
a common way of referring to "civil rights," which included the legally
protected rights one received in return for surrendering to the gov-
ernment the natural right, or "executive power," to enforce one's own
rights.
Both in his prototype and in his final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment, [Senator John A.] Bingham used the words privileges
and immunities as a shorthand description of fundamental or consti-
tutional rights. Use of the words in this way had a long and distin-
guished heritage. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England,
published in the colonies on the eve of the Revolution, had divided
the rights and liberties of Englishmen into those "immunities" that
were the residuum of natural liberties and those "privileges" that society had
provided in lieu of natural rights.
82
If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to protect
natural rights-or even civil rights-why did they use the term "privi-
leges or immunities" instead? The short answer is that they did so
because, while "privileges or immunities" include natural rights, it is a
broader phrase that includes additional rights.
To appreciate this, we must begin by considering what was then a
controversial interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the original
Constitution: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."83 From the
earliest days of the United States some argued that this provision re-
ferred to the fundamental or natural rights that belonged to every
citizen of the United States. That this was truly the original meaning
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV has been con-
tested.84 It is not seriously disputed, however, that some time after
ratification it came to be widely insisted by some judges, scholars, and
opponents of slavery that Article IV was indeed a reference to natural
rights. Nor is it disputed that, whenever it first developed, the mem-
bers of the Thirty-Ninth Congress meant to import this meaning into
82 CURTIS, supra note 80, at 64 (emphasis added).
83 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
84 Compare Chester James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Fou, 9 WM. & MARY L. REiv. 1 passim (1967)
(contending that the clause referred to natural rights), with David S. Bogen, The Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 794, 796 (1987) (argu-
ing that the clause was "not a reference to natural law, but was solely concerned with
creating a national citizenship"). In accord with Antieau is Michael Conant, An-
timonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases
Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 817 (1982).
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the text of the Constitution by using the language of "privileges" and
"immunities" in the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 5
The antebellum argument that privileges and immunities in-
cluded natural rights was made famously in 1823 by Justice Bushrod
Washington, while sitting as a circuit court trial judge in the case of
Corfield v. Coryell.86 Because this language was so often repeated by
those seeking to find federal protection of fundamental rights, espe-
cially by members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, I present it in full:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expres-
sions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free gov-
ernments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens
of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fun-
damental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than dif-
ficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government;
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may
justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take,
hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an ex-
emption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the
other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particu-
lar privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced
by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental:
to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and es-
tablished by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be
exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are,
85 This is conceded even by those who deny that the original meaning of "privi-
leges and immunities" in Article [V was a reference to natural rights. See Bogen,
supra note 84, at 843:
This array of arguments [that the clause referred to natural rights] proved
persuasive to a generation confronted with the moral breakdown of society
represented by slavery. Slavery was constitutional, but contrary to funda-
mental principles of natural law. The symbolic honor and integrity of the
Constitution could be saved by identifying it with fundamental rights. This
the framers of the fourteenth amendment attempted to do in the privileges
and immunities clause of that amendment.
86 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 3230).
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strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of
them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was mani-
festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the cor-
responding provision in the old articles of confederation) "the
better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states of the Union."
8 7
While this passage includes reference to what were considered
natural or inherent liberty rights, "privileges and immunities" here
unquestionably refers also to such positive civil rights as the "protec-
tion of government" that one receives in exchange for surrendering
one's power of enforcement. As employed by Justice Washington, it is
a broader term that also includes other fundamental rights created by
state and federal constitutions, such as "the elective franchise, as regu-
lated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which
it is to be exercised."
8 8
Chester Antieau observed that "it would be almost impossible to
overestimate the importance of the above quotation upon American
law."8' 9 Of greatest relevance, Corfield was repeatedly cited by some
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress as constitutional justification
for their passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided in sec-
tion 1 that
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previ-
ous condition of slavery... shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 90
Most, if not all, of the rights on this list are unenumerated liberty
rights of the sort accepted at the Founding.
Senator Lyman Trumbell, a former justice of the Illinois Supreme
Court, was the principal draftsman of both the Thirteenth Amend-
ment prohibiting involuntary servitude and the Civil Rights Act of
1866. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he took the
floor of the Senate to argue that Congress had the authority to pass
the Civil Rights Act under, among other provisions, the Privileges and
87 Id. at 551-52.
88 Whether the right to vote was among the privileges or immunities protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment later became a matter of some controversy. But there is
little doubt that the right to ajury trial, though not a natural right, was considered a
privilege or immunity of citizenship by the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment.
89 Antieau, supra note 84, at 12.
90 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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Immunities Clause of Article IV: "What rights are secured to the citi-
zens of each State under that provision? Such fundamental rights as
belong to every free person."91 To establish this interpretation, he
cited several judicial opinions and then offered, in its entirety, the
quotation from Washington's opinion in Corfield that appears above. 92
In another speech advocating the override of President Johnson's
veto of the Civil Rights Act, Trumbell posed the question, "[w]hat
rights do citizens of the United States have?" He answered, "They are
those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or
free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill,
and they belong to them in all the States of the Union."93 As exam-
ples of "natural rights" and "inalienable rights" he offered these:
"'The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the
right to acquire and enjoy property."'
9 4
Along the same lines was the speech by Representative James F.
Wilson of Iowa, who was coauthor of the Thirteenth Amendment,
manager of the Civil Rights Bill in the House, and chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee. Wilson argued that "civil rights are the
natural rights of man; and these are the rights which this bill proposes
to protect every citizen in the enjoyment of throughout the entire do-
minion of the Republic." 95 After elaborating at length on these rights,
he concluded, "Before our Constitution was formed, the great funda-
mental rights which I have mentioned, belonged to every person who
became a member of our great national family. No one surrendered a
jot or tittle of these rights by consenting to the formation of the Gov-
ernment. ' 96 Without "the power. . . to secure these rights which ex-
isted anterior to the ordination of the Constitution," the government
would be "a failure in its most important office."
9 7
After the Civil Rights Bill was vetoed by President Johnson on the
ground that it exceeded the constitutional powers of Congress, Repre-
sentative William Lawrence, Republican of Ohio and a former state
court judge, rose to advocate overriding that veto. After a lengthy ex-
amination of the authorities on behalf of the proposition that
"[1] egislative powers exist in our system to protect, not to destroy, the
inalienable rights of men,"98 Lawrence noted that "[i] t has never been
91 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
92 Id. at 475.
93 Id. at 1757.
94 Id. (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *1).
95 Id. at 1117.
96 Id. at 1119.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1832-33.
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deemed necessary to enact in any constitution or law that citizens
should have the right to life or liberty or the right to acquire property.
These rights are recognized by the Constitution as existing anterior to
and independently of all laws and all constitutions."99 He concluded:
"Without further authority I may assume, then, that there are certain
absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and
of which a State cannot constitutionally deprive him."1°°
Lawrence also cited with approval Justice Washington's opinion
in Corfield, while elaborating that though "[t] he Constitution does not
define what these privileges and immunities" in Article IV are, they
"are of two kinds, to wit, those which I have shown to be inherent in
every citizen of the United States, and such others as may be con-
ferred by local law and pertain only to the citizen of the State."
1 0 1
This statement by Representative Lawrence confirms that "privileges
or immunities" was a reference both to inherent or natural rights and
to various rights or privileges created by the positive law of particular
governments.
As important to understanding the original meaning of the term
"privileges or immunities" were the explanations later offered by
members of Congress when discussing the Fourteenth Amendment.
After reading the same quotation from Justice Washington's opinion
in Corfield, Senator Jacob Howard, Republican and former Attorney
General of Michigan, stated: "Such is the character of the privileges
and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article
of the Constitution."1 0 2 He then continued: "To these privileges and
immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be
fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these
should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the
first eight amendments of the Constitution."'103
After listing these rights,1 0 4 Howard noted the fact that courts
had rejected the abolitionist argument that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV protected the rights of citizens from in-
fringement by state governments.
[I] t is a fact well worthy of attention that the course of decision of
our courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immuni-
ties, privileges, rights, thus guarantied by the Constitution or recog-
nized by it, are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United
99 Id. at 1833.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1836.
102 Id. at 2765.
103 Id.
104 Id. (including the "personal" right "to keep and to bear arms").
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States and as a party in their courts. They do not operate in the
slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation.
States are not affected by them .... 105
Thus the need for the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Now, sir, there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and
to carry out any of these guarantees . . . but they stand simply as a
bill of rights in the Constitution, without power on the part of Con-
gress to give them full effect; while at the same time the States are
not restrained from violating the principles embraced in them ex-
cept by their own local constitutions, which may be altered from
year to year. The great object of the first section of this amendment is,
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to
respect these great fundamental guarantees.1
0 6
The same sentiment was expressed by Congressman Frederick
Woodbridge, Republican of Vermont. The "object of the proposed
amendment," he said, was to give "the power to Congress to enact
those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the natural
rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship," or, in other words, "those
privileges and immunities which are guaranteed to him under the
Constitution of the United States."'10 7 That this represented a substan-
tial change in the relationship between state and federal governments
is difficult to overemphasize.
Those who seek to diminish the significance of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause have argued that, because it was enacted to consti-
tutionalize the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, the amendment only protects
against discrimination among the citizens of a state, the way the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination against out-of-
staters. The amendment does not say this, however, and there is little
if any evidence its original meaning was so limited. Instead it adopts
language that prohibits states from abridging the privileges or immu-
nities of some of its citizens or all of its citizens. In this way the clause
protects rights both from discriminatory laws, as well as from laws that
violate rights "absolutely" or across the board.
Still, the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 is relevant to confirming the
substance of privileges or immunities. For, notwithstanding that the
bill sought to protect blacks by holding states to the protection af-
forded the rights of whites, the fact remains that most of the "privi-
leges or immunities" protected by this statute were natural liberty
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2765-66 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
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rights. Those who try to limit the Fourteenth Amendment to the very
different words of the Civil Rights Bill are wrong. And they typically
fail to see how the proper connection of the Civil Rights Bill to the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes the crabbed interpretation of
these privileges or immunities that was adopted by the Supreme Court
within five years of its enactment over the ringing dissents of four
Justices.
I have seen little in the historical record to suggest exactly how
the rights "retained by the people" referred to in the Ninth Amend-
ment compared with the "privileges or immunities" protected by the
Fourteenth. The natural implication is that because both phrases orig-
inally referred to background, natural, or inherent rights, both provi-
sions refer to the same set of unenumerable rights, though they differ
on the jurisdiction created for the protection of these rights. Just as
the Fourteenth Amendment extended protection of the enumerated
rights of the first eight amendments to violations by state govern-
ments, so too did it extend federal protection of the preexisting
unenumerated rights "retained by the people." The quotations from
Justice Washington and others suggest that "privileges or immunities"
is a broader term including both natural or inherent rights as well as
those particular "positive" procedural rights created by the Bill of
Rights.
This was the view held by Ohio SenatorJohn Sherman, a Republi-
can member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress and future Secretary of
State who, some years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, pointed to the Ninth Amendment as evidencing the existence
of "other rights beyond those recognized"' 0 8 in the Bill of Rights.
Speaking to the Senate in 1872 in support of a civil rights bill to guar-
antee blacks and other citizens equal access to public accommoda-
tions-rights nowhere mentioned in the Constitution-Sherman
contended:
[T]he ordinary rights of citizenship, which no law has ever at-
tempted to define exactly, the privileges, immunities, and rights,
(because I do not distinguish between them, and cannot do it), of
citizens of the United States, such as are recognized by the common
law, such as are ingrafted in the great charters of England, some of
them in the constitutions of different States, and some of them in
the Declaration of Independence, our fathers did not attempt to
enumerate. They expressly said in the ninth amendment that they
would not attempt to enumerate these rights; they were innumera-
108 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 26 (1872) (statement of Sen. John
Sherman).
2004]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ble, depending upon the laws and the courts as from time to time
administered.' 0 9
Sherman conceded that "[t] here may be sometimes great dispute
and doubt as to what is the right, immunity, or privilege conferred
upon a citizen of the United States." 110 Nevertheless, the task of iden-
tifying that right must fall "from time to time [to] the judicial tribu-
nals." '1 11 To determine these rights, immunities, or privileges, judges
will look first at the Constitution of the United States as the primary
fountain of authority. If that does not define the right they will look
for the unenumerated powers to the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence, to every scrap of American history, to the history of En-
gland, to the common law of England, the old decisions of Lords
Mansfield and Holt, and so on back to the earliest recorded deci-
sions of the common law. There they will find the fountain and
reservoir of the rights of American as well as English citizens."
l 2
Sherman advocated his expansive, perhaps overly expansive,
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 1872. Little did he
know that this flywheel of the Fourteenth Amendment was about to be
excised and the amendment redacted by a bare majority of the Su-
preme Court.
III. THE DEMISE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
When the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
considered by the Supreme Court, its original meaning was set aside
109 Id. at 844 (statement of Sen. John Sherman).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. Senator Allen Thurman, an Ohio Democrat and former member of the
Ohio Supreme Court, agreed with Sherman that the retained rights referred to in the
Ninth Amendment are held by the people
against the Government of the United States by as good a title as they hold
them against the world. They belong to them as people or as individuals.
They have never surrendered them to any Government, and they do not
hold them by the grace of any Government whatsoever; they hold them be-
cause they were and are their inherent natural rights which have never been
surrendered.
Id. app. at 26. Nevertheless, Thurman also contended that these are not rights the
people hold "as citizens of the United States, but so to speak, in despite of the United
States." Id. Thurman was also concerned with the indefiniteness of identifying such
extratextual rights. "Where are we to find a definition of them?" he asked. Id. "The
Senator from Massachusetts finds the definition in the Declaration of Independence;
another Senator finds it in something else; and so on to the end of the chapter; and
we have nothing certain, nothing definite, nothing upon which any man can rely."
Id.
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by a five to four decision in what are called the Slaughter-House
Cases.113 It is very useful to revisit the opinions in these cases, both to
see the weakness of the majority's reasoning, and to examine carefully
the theories set forth in three separate dissents. These much ne-
glected dissenting opinions tell us a great deal about how the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was supposed to work. And this, in turn,
will help us discern the proper scope of the police powers of states.
The Slaughter-House Cases arose when, in 1869, the legislature of
Louisiana passed an act ordering all animals imported for consump-
tion in the city to be landed at certain places, and all intended for
food to be slaughtered there. The same law also conferred on seven-
teen persons the exclusive right to maintain landings for cattle and to
erect slaughterhouses, chartering them under the name of The Cres-
cent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company. This
law was challenged by the Live Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Associa-
tion, whose members would be prohibited from competing with the
new monopoly.
At the appellate court level, Supreme Court Justice Bradley, sit-
ting as a circuit courtjudge, 114 indicated sympathy for a constitutional
challenge based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause (although he
ruled that the federal courts did not have power to enjoin state pro-
ceedings initiated by the Crescent City Company). Bradley began by
distinguishing the new Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from the old Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV.15 The new provision "is not identical with the clause in
the constitution which declared that 'the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.' It embraces much more."11 6 The "Privileges and Immunities"
referred to in Article IV "were only such as each state gave to its own
citizens. Each was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own
citizens, and against the citizens of other states."' 17 But the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits any
state from abridging the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the
United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely
113 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
114 In those days before the creation of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, Justices
themselves "rode circuit" to hear appeals.
115 In what follows, I use "Privileges orImmunities Clause," to refer to the clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment. When I refer to "Privileges and Immunities Clause," I
mean the clause that appears in Article IV.
116 Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
117 Id.
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requires equality of privileges; but it demands that the privileges and
immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged,
unimpaired."' 18
In other words, while the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Ar-
ticle IV barred discrimination against out-of-staters, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred states both
from discriminating among different citizens within a state and from
abridging or impairing of the rights of all citizens even if the restric-
tions applied equally to all. Bradley then addressed the nature of
these privileges a state cannot invade. "It may be difficult to enumer-
ate or define them," he began,
[b] ut so far as relates to the question in hand, we may safely say it is
one of the privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow
such lawful industrial pursuit-not injurious to the community-as
he may see fit, without unreasonable regulation or molestation, and
without being restricted by any of those unjust, oppressive, and odi-
ous monopolies or exclusive privileges which have been condemned
by all free governments .... 119
According to Justice Bradley, this and other essential privileges
cannot be invaded without sapping the very foundations of republi-
can government. A republican government is not merely a govern-
ment of the people, but it is a free government. Without being free,
it is republican only in name, and not republican in truth, and any
government which deprives its citizens of the right to engage in any
lawful pursuit, subject only to reasonable restrictions, or at least sub-
ject only to such restrictions as are reasonably within the power of
government to impose,-is tyrannical and unrepublican. And if to
enforce arbitrary restrictions made for the benefit of a favored few,
it takes away and destroys the citizen's property without trial or con-
demnation, it is guilty of violating all the fundamental privileges to
which I have referred, and one of the fundamental principles of
free government.
1 20
When the various slaughterhouse cases finally made their way to
the full Supreme Court, Bradley's approach was rejected by a vote of
five to four. Writing for the majority, Justice Miller distinguished be-
tween the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, which
were created by the Constitution and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the privileges and immunities or "civil rights" of
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wrote in Corfield and were protected by the Privileges and Immunities
clause of Article IV.12 1 The latter "are those which belong to citizens
of the States as such, and.., they are left to the State governments for
security and protection, and not by this article placed under the spe-
cial care of the Federal government .... 2
In defense of this interpretation, Miller offered no direct evi-
dence from the statements of those who proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such proof would have been impossible. Instead, he ig-
nored the original meaning of the clause to rest his conclusion on the
consequences of holding otherwise. If the "privileges or immunities"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were as broad as the cate-
gory of "civil rights," he contended, then
not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress when-
ever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by
State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance, limit-
ing and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in
their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may
think proper on all such subjects.
1 23
This, argued Miller, would be to give Congress a national police
power that would supersede the traditional powers of the states in
every area of legislation and would "radically change[ ] the whole the-
ory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each
other and of both these governments to the people."' 24 "[I] n the ab-
sence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit
of doubt,"125 Miller concluded that "no such results were intended by
the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legisla-
tures of the States which ratified them." 126 Because the privilege to
pursue one's trade or occupation was a "civil right" and not a privilege
of national citizenship it was, therefore, unprotected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.
What then, according to Justice Miller, were the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship protected by the amendment? He
declined to elaborate since it was clear to him that the right asserted
by the claimants was not among them. But he did list a few "which
owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character,
its Constitution, or its laws." 127 A citizen has the right






127 Id. at 79.
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to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have
upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it,
to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering
its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, through
which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the
subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several
States....
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand
the care and protection of the Federal government over his life,
liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign government .... The right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United
States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several
States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign na-
tions, are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not
citizenship of a State.'
28
The dissenting justices, in separate opinions, took strong issue
with Miller's imputation of intent to Congress. On the majority's in-
terpretation, wrote Justice Field, "it was a vain and idle enactment,
which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Con-
gress and the people on its passage .... But if the amendment refers
to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the
inhibition has a profound significance and consequence."'12 9 What,
then, did Field think were the privileges or immunities that were se-
cured against abridgment by state legislation? Field's answer rested
importantly on evidence of original meaning.
First, privileges or immunities included the civil rights protected
by the Civil Rights Act: "the right 'to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property.'"130 He also referenced the list recited by Justice Washing-
ton in Corfield:
Mr. Justice Washington said he had "no hesitation in confining
these expressions to those privileges and immunities which were, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong of right to citizens of all
free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several States which compose the Union, from the
128 Id. at 79-80 (quotation omitted).
129 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
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time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign;" and, in
considering what those fundamental privileges were, he said that
perhaps it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate them,
but that they might be "all comprehended under the following gen-
eral heads: protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, neverthe-
less, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole."
131
To Justice Field, this appeared "to be a sound construction of the
clause in question. The privileges and immunities designated are
those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments.'13 2 Unlike
Miller, Field referred to the congressional debates, noting that
repeated reference was made to this language of Mr. Justice Wash-
ington. It was cited by Senator Trumbull with the observation that
it enumerated the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United
States set forth in the first section of the act, and with the statement
that all persons born in the United States, being declared by the act
citizens of the United States, would thenceforth be entitled to the
rights of citizens, and that these were the great fundamental rights
set forth in the act; and that they were set forth "as appertaining to
every freeman."
133
In essence, the majority found there to be two classes of privileges
and immunities: national and state. The national ones were those spe-
cifically designated in the Constitution or directly derivable from its
national character; the state ones were the full panoply of natural or
"civil rights" that pertain to all free persons. The Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the former abso-
lutely, while the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
protects the latter by protecting citizens from discrimination when
they are residing or acting in other states. In contrast, Justice Field
contended that there was just one set of privileges and/or immunities
that formerly had been unprotected from state infringement, but
which had been given national protection by the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As between the two, the dissenters' position
is clearly more consonant with the origins and original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Like Justice Field's opinion, which discussed the original mean-
ing of "privileges or immunities," Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion
elaborated the arguments he had made earlier while riding circuit
131 Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 98 (Field, J., dissenting).
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concerning the meaning of this phrase, and again quoted Justice
Washington's opinion in Corfield. But Bradley also offered an impor-
tant theoretical rebuttal to Justice Miller's contention that equating
"privileges or immunities" with civil rights would be to establish a
broad national power that would supersede those of the states.
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubt-
edly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted.
But there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regula-
tion cannot infringe. It may prescribe the manner of their exercise,
but it cannot subvert the rights themselves.1
3 4
In this neglected passage, Justice Bradley made a crucial distinc-
tion I mentioned above: the distinction between regulating the exer-
cise of a civil right and improperly subverting or abridging its exercise;
or between "regulating and facilitating" rightful conduct and "prohib-
iting or discouraging" it. States were free to regulate civil rights-that
is, specify "the manner of their exercise"-and Congress was not em-
powered by the Fourteenth Amendment to do so. What the amend-
ment did was to give the national government jurisdiction to protect
these civil rights from being improperly abridged or subverted in the
name of the "right of regulation." In the last portion of his dissent,
Justice Bradley examined whether the monopoly at issue in the
Slaughter-House Cases was a reasonable regulation and concluded that
it was not.
Justice Bradley also offered a useful distinction between the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause and its Due Pro-
cess Clause. Among the most fundamental privileges or immunities
protected by both provisions were those described by Blackstone as
that of life, liberty, and property, and by the Declaration of Indepen-
dence as that of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
These are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by
due process of law, and which can only be interfered with, or the
enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful regulations neces-
sary or proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I contend,
belong to the citizens of every free government.
1 35
The function of the Due Process Clause can be seen as prohibit-
ing a state from depriving particular individuals, whether citizens or
not, of their life, liberty, or property ("Nor shall the state deprive any
person...") 136 The function of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
to protect the citizenry as a whole against unnecessary or improper
134 Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
135 Id. at 116 (Bradley,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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legislation that infringes upon the exercise of their civil rights or lib-
erty ("No state shall make or enforce any law. . ."). 37 In other words,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, one
cannot have his or her rights taken away without due process of law.
And under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice Bradley would
require that legislation that purported to "regulate" or modify the ex-
ercise of any civil right-including that to life, liberty, and property-
be both necessary and proper for the common good.
In this way, Justice Bradley resolved an obvious and long-standing
tension between the two provisions. If the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is read to protect the rights found in the Bill of Rights, how is it
that states may not abridge such rights as the right peaceably to assem-
ble, but may abridge what appears to be the even more fundamental
rights to life, liberty, and property on condition only that "due pro-
cess" is provided? The answer is (1) that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause includes the rights of life, liberty, and property in addition to
those listed in the Bill of Rights, and (2) that legislation that improp-
erly "abridges"-rather than regulates-the entire set of civil rights is
prohibited, whereas even a proper law138 may not be used to deprive
any particular person of her life, liberty, or property unless she is ac-
corded due process. Whereas the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects a broad set of rights-including life, liberty, and property-
of all citizens from improper laws, the Due Process Clause protects the
life, liberty, or property of all persons from an improper application of
an otherwise proper law. 139
Bradley also responded to Justice Miller's claim that providing
federal protection of fundamental civil rights would bring into federal
courts the full panoply of cases now decided by state courts. "As the
privileges and immunities protected are only those fundamental ones
which belong to every citizen, they would soon become so far defined
as to cause but a slight accumulation of business in the Federal courts.
Besides, the recognized existence of the law would prevent its fre-
quent violation."' 140 By placing so much weight on consequences, the
137 Id. (emphasis added).
138 A proper law is one that either regulates rightful or prohibits wrongful
behavior.
139 Because citizens may have more privileges than aliens, a law may treat them
differently and still be proper under the Privileges or Immunities Clause-though
citizens from other states are protected against discrimination within a state by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Nevertheless, all persons, whether or
not they are citizens, have a right under the Due Process Clause to have otherwise
proper laws applied to them with due process.
140 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 124 (Bradley, J., dissenting)
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majority was, thought Bradley, putting the cart before the horse. "The
great question is, What is the true construction of the amendment?
When once we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect.
The argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very control-
ling influence in questions of this sort."'
' 4
1
Justice Miller's majority opinion has long been thought to have
gutted the Privileges or Immunities clause of any real significance
and, indeed, after Slaughter-House it ceased to play any important func-
tion. On the other hand, as has been pointed out by Kevin Newsom,
Miller's opinion can be interpreted (though it has not been) as adopt-
ing the middle ground of protecting all the rights explicitly protected
in the Constitution-including the Bill of Rights-but not the "civil
rights" that are unmentioned there. 142 The majority opinion's refer-
ence to the right in the First Amendment to peaceably assemble as a
protected privilege or immunity of national citizenship supports New-
som's interpretation of the case. If Newsom is right, then the butchers
lost because the right they asserted was not among those that were
enumerated in the Constitution.
While a significant advance over the prevailing view of Slaughter-
House, even this more expansive interpretation of Miller's opinion
conflicts with the original meaning of "privileges or immunities." As
we have seen, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its sup-
porters in Congress, spoke often of protecting the Bill of Rights from
infringement by states, but they clearly did not limit the meaning of
this clause to these rights. They repeatedly referred to Justice Wash-
ington's expansive list of rights in Corfield, to the concept of natural or
"civil" rights, in addition to the privileges contained in the Bill of
Rights. Among these additional privileges or immunities rights were
the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. And they made no
distinction whatever between classes of state and national privileges or
immunities.
In his dissenting opinion, the third of the three dissents filed in
the case, Justice Swayne made much the same originalist point:
The construction adopted by the majority of my brethren is, in my
judgment, much too narrow. It defeats, by a limitation not antici-
pated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed and
of those by whom it was adopted. To the extent of that limitation it
turns, as it were, what was meant for bread into a stone. By the
Constitution, as it stood before the war, ample protection was given
141 Id. (BradleyJ., dissenting).
142 See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE LJ. 643, 706 (2000).
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against oppression by the Union, but little was given against wrong
and oppression by the States. That want was intended to be supplied
by this amendment. Against the former this court has been called
upon more than once to interpose. Authority of the same ampli-
tude was intended to be conferred as to the latter. But this arm of
our jurisdiction is, in these cases, stricken down by the judgment
just given. Nowhere, than in this court, ought the will of the nation,
as thus expressed, to be more liberally construed or more cordially
executed. This determination of the majority seems to me to lie far
in the other direction.
143
Swayne concluded by expressing his earnest "hope that the conse-
quences to follow may prove less serious and far-reaching than the
minority fear they will be.'
The Fourteenth Amendment was born of a newfound distrust of
state governments. The immediate cause of this distrust was, of
course, the imposition of chattel slavery by state governments in the
South before the war and the resistance to reconstruction afterward.
But while it was instigated by the experience of reconstruction, the
Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to apply only to former
slaves. Indeed, among the core of its concerns was the protection of
free speech, peaceable assembly, and the right to keep and bear arms
by white, as well as black, supporters of Reconstruction. 145 Both
before and after the Civil War, the civil liberties of white unionists and
abolitionists were severely restricted in the South, much to the dismay
of Northern Republicans.
4 6
Moreover, the principles that were advanced against slavery ap-
plied to whites in another way. Abolitionists had developed a princi-
ple known as "free labor."1 47 The right to one's labor was one's own,
they argued, and could be alienated only by consent. Even when a
contract to work for another was made, such contracts could not be
143 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 130 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
145 See generally CURTIS, supra note 80.
146 See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition
Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1109, 1120 (1997) (discussing how states in the South abridged the
First Amendment rights of abolitionists).
147 For the history of the American tradition of free labor, see generally ERIc
FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIL WAR (1970); ROBERTJ. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR:
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870
(1991).
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specifically or coercively enforced.1 48 As was explained in the 1865
case of Ford v. Jermon,
[i]s it not obvious that a contract for personal services thus enforced
would be but a mitigated form of slavery, in which the party would
have lost the right to dispose of himself as a free agent, and be, for a
greater or less length of time, subject to the control of another?'
49
Like the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibited involuntary
servitude, the free labor principle protected whites as well as blacks.
Although the facts in Slaughter-House did not concern African slavery
or its vestiges, the dissent nonetheless understood the liberty to pur-
sue an occupation to be a fundamental right closely related to "free
labor." The monopoly granted by Louisiana, they argued, directly
abridged the right to pursue the lawful occupation of butcher by de-
priving butchers of the requisite of maintaining a slaughterhouse.
Soon after its adoption, then, the Fourteenth Amendment was
invoked by citizens seeking protection of their liberties from improper
restrictions by states that were not (apparently) motivated by racial
discrimination. While the decision in Slaughter-House effectively fore-
closed using the Privileges or Immunities Clause for this purpose, the
theories advanced by the four dissenters were later shifted to the Due
Process Clause and, for a time, came to prevail.
Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause was largely gutted
by the conventional interpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases,150
there are signs that it is not yet a dead letter.151 Moreover, after
Slaughter-House, the courts began using the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses to provide much the same constraint on state
power that was originally intended to result from the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, albeit with less textual justification. The "absolute"
protection against laws that violate the privileges or immunities of all
citizens has been shifted to the Due Process Clause, although not to
the degree warranted by the original meaning of the Privileges or Im-
148 See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding
Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775, 795-99 (1992) (describing
how the free labor concept affected early judicial stances towards specific perform-
ance of labor contracts).
149 Ford v.Jermon, 6 Phila. 6, 7 (1865). The suit concerned the specific perform-
ance of an actor. Plaintiff Ford was also the owner of the theater in which Lincoln was
murdered.
150 Though this interpretation may have exaggerated the degree to which the ma-
jority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases undercut the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states. See Newsom, supra note 142, at 666.
151 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (grounding the unenumerated
right to travel in the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
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munities Clause. Likewise, the protection against laws that discrimi-
nated against a particular class of citizens was shifted to the Equal
Protection Clause, the original purpose of which was to require the
state judiciary and executive branch officials equally to apply and en-
force necessary and proper laws.
IV. CONSTRUING WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT SAY: THE
POLICE POWER OF THE STATES
With the meaning of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments in
hand, we are in a position finally to consider the proper scope of state
power. Our task is to define the scope of the power left in the hands
of state government that is consistent with the above conception of
the liberty rights "retained by the people" as well as the "privileges or
immunities" of citizens. Given that no provision of the written Consti-
tution specifies the power of states over their citizens, any such doc-
trine of state power must be a constitutional construction-but one
that is consistent with the equal protection of liberty rights, privileges
or immunities retained by the people explicitly protected by the text.
Strictly speaking we are not seeking a doctrine of what powers are
delegated to states under the Constitution. We are seeking a doctrine
to identify those powers that the people of the states may, if they
choose, delegate to their state governments by means of their state
constitutions without violating the Constitution of the United States. Any
assessment of the power held by a particular state must begin by exam-
ining its constitution. In this Article, I am considering only the
proper scope or limits of the powers that may, but need not be, dele-
gated to a particular state government by its constitution.
The most obvious power of states that follows from the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the power to pro-
hibit any violations by some citizens of the liberties or rights of other
citizens. In addition to the power of prohibiting wrongful conduct, the
power of states may also properly include the power of regulating right-
Jul behavior. It is no coincidence, then, that this very conception of
state power came to be advocated by courts and commentators seek-
ing to respect and protect the background rights of the people. This
power was called the power of police or the "police power" of the
states. It is notorious for being difficult to define and limit.
152
152 See, e.g., 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 213 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890) ("I can find
no satisfactory definition of this phrase, 'police power,' in the decisions of the Su-
preme Court itself."); Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power.., 7 COLUM. L. REx'.
322, 322 (1907) ("No phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less under-
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A. Origins of the Doctrine of the "Police" Power
Because the police power of states was not included in the text of
the original Constitution, we are not bound by what the Founders may
have thought this concept entailed. Nevertheless, examining the few
instances where it was discussed reveals that it referred originally to
those powers not delegated to the federal government. The phrase
"internal police" was used seven times by delegates to refer to the
power of state governments; once this power was referred to as "their
police." 153 The issue of the police power of states arose when the Con-
vention was still considering making a general grant of power to the
national government, but wished to ensure that the "[National Legis-
lature should] not... interfere with the government of the individual
States in any matters of internal police ... wherein the general welfare
of the United States is not concerned."'1 54 In The Federalist, Hamilton
employed the term "domestic police" twice in essays denying that the
national government was a threat to state power. 155
The term "police" was rarely used in the state ratification conven-
tions. On two occasions in New York it was used to refer to the power
of states. John Williams insisted that "[t] he constitution should be so
formed as not to swallow up the state governments: the general gov-
ernment ought to be confined to certain national objects; and the
states should retain such powers as concern their own internal po-
lice. 1 5 6 Hamilton contended that there might be more force in this
type of objection,
[w]ere the laws of the Union to new-model the internal police of
any state; were they to alter, or abrogate at a blow, the whole of its
stood than the one which forms the subject of the present discussion."); Collins
Denny, Jr., The Growth and Development of the Police Power of the State, 20 MICH. L. REV.
173, 173 (1921) ("The police power of the state is one of the most difficult phases of
our law to understand, and it is even more difficult to define it and to place it within
any bounds.").
153 See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 165 (Max Farrand
ed., 3d ed. 1966) (statement of Mr. Williamson,June 8, 1787); 2 id. at 21 (Journal of
the Convention,July 17, 1787); 2 id. at 25 (statement of Mr. Sherman, July 17, 1787);
2 id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Morris, July 17, 1787); 2 id. at 367 (statement of Mr.
Rutledge, Aug. 22, 1787); 2 id. at 629 (statement of Mr. Sherman, Sept. 15, 1787); 2
id. at 630 (statement of Mr. Sherman, Sept. 15, 1787).
154 2 id. at 21 (quoting from a resolution proposed to the convention).
155 See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 12, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The
regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender
allurements to ambition."); THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 12, at 209 (Alexander
Hamilton) (referring to "expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to
the mere domestic police of a state").
156 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 241.
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civil and criminal institutions; were they to penetrate the recesses of
domestic life, and control, in all respects, the private conduct of
individuals.
157
Elsewhere, the term was used during the debate over the powers of
Congress to control the national capital. In Pennsylvania, it was pro-
posed that the Constitution be amended so that the powers of Con-
gress "be qualified by a proviso that such right of legislation extend
only to such regulations as respect the police and good order
thereof."1 58 The term "police" was also used in the same manner sev-
eral times in the Virginia convention.
159
Only slight elaboration is added by St. George Tucker in his trea-
tise on the Constitution:
The congress of the United States possesses no power to regulate, or
interfere with the domestic concerns, or police of any state: it be-
longs not to them to establish any rules respecting the rights of
property; nor will the constitution permit any prohibition of arms to
the people; or of peaceable assemblies by them, for any purposes
whatsoever, and in any number, whenever they may see occasion.
1 60
In none of these uses, however, is the scope of this power made clear.
What, then, did it mean?
In one sense, the term is almost completely open-ended. Samuel
Johnson defined "police" as "It]he regulation and government of a
city or country, so far as regards the inhabitants."1 61 Apart from rein-
forcing the distinction between "regulate" and, "govern" that I have
examined elsewhere, 162 this definition adds only the idea that the po-
lice power is a power over individuals (as opposed to a power over
subsidiary governmental units). It adds little to our understanding
the proper scope of the power to regulate and govern individuals.
The same can be said about the early Supreme Court opinions by
157 2 id. at 267-68.
158 2 id. at 545.
159 See e.g., 3 id. at 432 (statement of Mr. Mason, June 16, 1788); 3 id. at 434
(statement of Mr. Grayson, June 16, 1788).
160 Tucker, supra note 33, at 315-16. Notice Tucker's statement that the right to
arms forbids disarming people, that this is an equivalent to the individual right of
assembly, and note also his use of the term "prohibition" to denote what the right to
keep and bear arms bars.
161 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICrIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W.
Strahan 1755).
162 See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,
55 ARK. L..Rrv. 847, 863-65 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101, 139-43 (2001).
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John Marshall distinguishing the "regulations of interstate commerce"
from "police power regulations."'
1 63
As Laurence Tribe has noted, "these labels appear to have been
largely conclusory; whatever their internal coherence or their predic-
tive value for those who used them, they reveal little of the analysis
underlying the decisions in which they played a role."
164
As a doctrine, the police power is of recent vintage. As one influ-
ential commentator wrote in 1900:
The Police Power is a well recognized if not yet fully defined depart-
ment of constitutional law. It is also the newest one of anything
near equal importance. The 1898 edition of Bouvier's Law Diction-
ary says that the law on this subject is all of recent growth, and most
of it is in the last half of the nineteenth century. It could not con-
sistently say otherwise. The work as originally published in 1839 did
not define the phrase "Police Power" nor even contain it. The thir-
teenth edition in 1867 did not have it. It was only in 1883 that this
standard dictionary of law first explained the phrase. The volumi-
nous United States Digest did not include the phrase, either in its
original edition or in its revision in 1873, among its separate head-
ings, nor among its subdivisions of constitutional law. It was not
until 1879 that it began to appear among the subdivisions of consti-
tutional law in the annual supplements of that work.
1 65
The original meaning of the police power is notoriously hard to
define, for good reason. As this evidence shows, until the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was simply that power contained in state constitutions,
which did not conflict with the powers delegated to the United States
or prohibited by it to the states. Its scope was therefore a matter of
textual interpretation and construction by state courts. Because of the
Supremacy Clause, federal courts did not need to examine the scope
of the police power as, whatever its scope, it was simply trumped by
any express prohibition or inconsistent delegated federal power.
Therefore, until passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there simply
was no reason to develop what might be called a "positive theory" of
the police power that could trump even state constitutions. Such a
theory immediately became necessary, however, once the Constitution
was amended to give the national government the power to protect
the privileges or immunities of citizens from infringements by their
own state governments. And such a theory was swiftly produced.
163 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-10 (1824).
164 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1047 (3d ed. 2000).
165 W.G. Hastings, The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the
Police Power of the State, 39 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'v 359, 359-60 (1900). Hastings's analy-
sis was widely cited and relied upon by other works on the subject.
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B. The Lockean Theory of the Police Power
In 1868, the same year the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted,
the first edition of Thomas M. Cooley's A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the Ameri-
can Union was published. 16 6 Cooley, then a justice on the Michigan
Supreme Court and the Jay Professor of Law at the University of Mich-
igan, sought to address the question of "conflict between national and
State authority" as well as the question of "whether the State exceeds
its just powers in dealing with the property and restraining the actions
of individuals." 167 The answers to these questions turned on the con-
tent of the police power, which he defined in light of previous judicial
opinions as follows:
The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its system
of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to preserve the
public order and to prevent offences against the State, but also to
establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of
good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to pre-
vent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like
enjoyment of rights by others.
168
The last part of this definition can be conceptualized as the
power of a state to protect the rights of each of its citizens from being
violated by any other person in society and to permit the exercise of
one's rights in such a manner as to prevent such exercise from intrud-
ing upon the like rights of others. Whereas the protection afforded
common law rights by adjudication occurs after they have been vio-
lated, police power regulations seek to facilitate or "make regular" the
exercise of these rights and prevent their infringement before the
fact.169 Whereas damage actions compensate for past violations of
rights, the police power permits laws necessary to prevent rights viola-
tions from occurring.
There is no enumeration or list of specific state powers for much
the same reason the Founders thought rights could not be compre-
hensively listed. Just as all the ways that liberty may be exercised right-
166 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1866).
167 Id. at 572.
168 Id.
169 I refer to "police power regulation" because, in Lockean theory, adjudication is
also an exercise of police power. See infra notes 172-88 and accompanying text.
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fully cannot be enumerated in advance, neither can all the specific
ways that people may transgress upon the rights of others:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which
this power is or may be exercised, because the various cases in which
the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with a simi-
lar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or
safety, are infinite in number and in variety.
170
Like the modern doctrine that views content-neutral "time, place,
and manner" regulations of speech to be consistent with the First
Amendment, the police power provides the states with the authority
"to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and
circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or exer-
cise their rights, without coming in conflict with any of those constitu-
tional principles which are established for the protection of private
rights or private property."'
171
Cooley's conception of the police power descended from the
same Lockean natural rights theory on which the Ninth Amendment
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause were based. In the prepoliti-
cal "state of nature," people are in possession of all their natural
rights, including the right to execute or enforce their rights against
other persons. "[I1n the state of Nature," wrote Locke, "every one has the
Executive Power of the Law of Nature." 172 However, in such a state, it
can be objected that "it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their
own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their
Friends. And on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge
will carry them too far in punishing others." 173 For this reason, "noth-
ing but Confusion and Disorder will follow," and government is
needed "to restrain the partiality and violence of Men.
1 74
Locke readily conceded
that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences
of the State of Nature, which must certainly be Great, where Men
may be Judges in their own Case, since 'tis easily to be imagined,
that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce
be so just as to condemn himself for it.
1 7 5
For this reason,
170 COOLEY, supra note 166, at 594.
171 Id. at 597.
172 LocKE, supra note 61, at 275.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 275-76.
175 Id. at 276.
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the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, in-
different, and the same to all Parties; and by Men having Authority
from the Community, for the execution of those Rules, decides all
the differences that may happen between any Members of that Soci-
ety, concerning any matter of right; and punishes those Offences
which any Member hath committed against the Society, with such
Penalties as the Law has established.
1 76
For Locke, an impartial judiciary applying a common law defines "civil
society":
Those who are united into one Body, and have a common estab-
lish'd Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide
Controversies between them, and punish Offenders, are in Civil Soci-
ety one with another: but those who have no such common Appeal, I
mean on Earth, are still in the state of Nature, each being, where
there is no other, Judge for himself, and Executioner; which is, as I
have before shew'd it, the perfect state of Nature.177
Thus, according to Lockean political theory, the first duty of gov-
ernment is to provide standing general rules for the equal protection
of the rights retained by each person, and these rights, in turn, pro-
vide the baseline against which to assess the propriety of government
actions and the justice of positive rules of law. But Locke also cau-
tioned those who saw government as the solution to the inconve-
niences of the state of nature that these inconveniences did not justify
a Leviathan with unlimited power of the sort advocated by Hobbes:
Absolute Monarchs are but Men, and if Government is to be the Rem-
edy of those Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens being Judges
in their own Cases, and the State of Nature is therefore not to be
endured, I desire to know what kind of Government that is, and
how much better it is than the State of Nature, where one Man,
commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be Judge in his own
Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases, without the
least liberty to any one to question or controle those who Execute
his Pleasure? And in whatsoever he doth, whether led by Reason,
Mistake or Passion, must be submitted to?
1 7 8
From this, Locke concluded that the state of nature with no gov-
ernment is preferable to an "absolute" or unlimited government, be-
cause at least in the state of nature, "Men are not bound to submit to
the unjust will of another: And if he that judges, judges amiss in his
176 Id. at 324.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 276.
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own, or any other Case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
Mankind."1
79
The propriety of the laws made by the legislature is dictated by
the rationale for yielding the lawmaking power to the government.
"Men, when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and
Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the
Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the
Society shall require."' s0 This "good of society," however, is no open-
ended grant of power simply to do good; as was discussed above, 18 1 it
is defined and limited by the rights retained by the people when they
surrender their powers of enforcement, and this is what makes it a
genuine common good or good for everyone, not merely a segment
or faction of society.
[I]t being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse),
the power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can
never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good .... 182
And to secure this "common good," the legislature "is obliged to se-
cure every ones Property by providing against those three defects...
that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie."'8 3
These three defects are (1) the want of "an establish'd, settled,
known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the Stan-
dard of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all
Controversies between them";8 4 (2) the want of "a known and indiffer-
ent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences according to the
established Law";'8 5 and (3) the want of the "Power to back and sup-
port the Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution."'8 6
Therefore,
whoever has the Legislative or Supream Power of any Common-
wealth, is bound to govern by establish'd standing Laws, promul-
gated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary Decrees;
by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by
179 Id.
180 Id. at 371.
181 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
182 LocKE, supra note 61, at 371.
183 Id.
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those Laws; And to imploy the force of the Community at home,
only in the Execution of such Laws .... 187
According to Lockean political theory, then, because people
form government to secure their rights of liberty and property more
effectively than they can secure them on their own, the executive or
police power must be limited to the advancement of the common
good, which is accomplished by protecting those same retained rights.
In this way, Lockean theory provides both a powerful rationale for and
an important limit upon the powers of government that is reflected in
the police power doctrine. The police power is the legitimate author-
ity of states to regulate rightful and prohibit wrongful acts.
The relationship between the exercise of inalienable natural lib-
erty rights and regulation was nicely described by Charles Bufford in
1916, and is worth quoting at length:
[I]f, in attempted exercise of inalienable rights, an individual
should do with his own or conduct himself as he willed, without the
internal restraint of conscience or the external restraint of law,
others less able than himself to assert and defend their personal and
property rights would, by reason of his unregulated assertion of his
own personal and property rights, inevitably suffer an infringement
of their equally inalienable rights. The common experience of
mankind is that the restraints of conscience can not be relied upon
in every case to restrain individuals from infringing the rights of
others. Thus, that men may live together in society and enjoy some
equality [in] their inalienable rights, it becomes necessary that each
be subjected in the enjoyment of his own rights to at least some
measure of regulation by legislation.
In other words, the guaranty of individual freedom and individ-
ual property, of the right of the individual to do with his own and to
conduct himself as he wills, can not be applied abstractly as though
there were but one individual and he a law unto himself; but must
be applied concretely in the light of the relationship of each indi-
vidual to others, and of the principle necessary to the friendly inter-
course of men with men as equals expressed in the maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, "so use your own as not to injure
another's."
It thus appears that the inalienable rights of every one are sub-
ject to such regulation by legislation as tends to prevent him in the
exercise of his own inalienable rights from unreasonably infringing
187 Id. at 371.
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upon those of others, and to secure to him the same uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own inalienable rights as others enjoy.1 88
Unsurprisingly, the Lockean theory of the police power adopted
by Cooley and others to identify when states violate the injunctions of
the Fourteenth Amendment is generally consistent with the concep-
tion of natural rights to which the framers of the Constitution and
Fourteenth Amendment adhered. (And it would need to be so to
avoid violating this amendment.) Natural rights define the boundary
or space within which people are at liberty to do as they please, pro-
vided their actions do not interfere with the rightful actions of others
operating within their own boundaries or spaces. Just as it is proper
to prohibit wrongful or rights-violating conduct, proper police power
regulations specify the manner in which persons may exercise their
liberties so as to prevent them from accidentally interfering with the
rights of others.
Cooley was not the only theorist to put flesh on the bones of this
Lockean natural rights theory of police power. After Cooley, the lead-
ing nineteenth century theorist of the police power was Professor
Christopher Tiedeman. In his 1886 A Treatise on the Limitations of Po-
lice Power in the United States Considered from both a Civil and Criminal
Standpoint,'8 9 he repeatedly relied on the power to prevent rights vio-
lations to identify reasonable and therefore constitutional exercises of
the police power. To explain the police power and its limits he began
with the concept of natural rights:
The private rights of the individual, apart from a few statutory
rights, which when compared with the whole body of private rights
are insignificant in number, do not rest upon the mandate of mu-
nicipal law as a source. They belong to man in a state of nature;
they are natural rights, rights recognized and existing in the law of
reason. 190
Like Locke, Tiedeman defined the legitimate purpose of govern-
ment as the protection of these rights. "The object of government is
to impose that degree of restraint upon human actions, which is nec-
essary to the uniform and reasonable conservation and enjoyment of
private rights. Government and municipal law protect and develop,
rather than create, private rights." 19 1 Government protects and devel-
ops these rights by preventing people from violating the rights of
188 Charles Bufford, The Scope and Meaning of Police Power, 4 CAL. L. REV. 269, 269,
272 (1916).
189 TIEDEMAN, supra note 1.
190 Id. at 1.
191 Id.
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others. "The conservation of private rights is attained by the imposi-
tion of a wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such a restraint as
will prevent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of
them. . . . The power of the government to impose this restraint is
called POLICE POWER."
192
While the Lockean theory of the police power, as developed by
Cooley, Tiedeman, and others, was generally consistent with the back-
ground rights retained by the people, this power was sometimes con-
strued more broadly than was proper. In particular, the police power
was typically construed to empower states to protect not only the
"health and safety" of the general public, but its "morals" as well. For
example, in the 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas, Justice Harlan rejected
a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the prohibition of manufac-
turing and selling alcohol on the ground that "[i]t cannot be sup-
posed that the States intended, by adopting that Amendment, to
impose restraints upon the exercise of their powers for the protection
of the safety, health, or morals of the community."' 93 By this rationale,
courts upheld the power of states to prohibit gambling, the consump-
tion of alcohol, prostitution, doing business on the Sabbath, and
other types of activities that did not violate the rights of others.
Some of these expansions were recognized by leading police
power theorists as improper even at the time. Christopher Tiedeman,
for example, contended that legislation prohibiting gambling "would
be open to serious constitutional objections. Gambling or betting of
any kind is a vice and not a trespass, and inasmuch as the parties are
willing victims of the evil effects, there is nothing which calls for pub-
lic regulation.' 94 According to this view, "[n]o law can make vice a
crime, unless it becomes by its consequence a trespass upon the rights
of the public."1 95 For Tiedeman, the protection of rights is the mea-
sure of proper police power regulations.
192 Id. at 1-2.
193 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887) (emphasis added). In Mugler, Jus-
tice Harlan explained why judicial review was essential to cabin the police power:
If... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to
those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
Constitution.
1d. at 661.
194 TIEDEMAN, supra note 1, at 260.
195 Id. at 291. Tiedeman also thought that "when they pursue gambling as a busi-
ness, and set up a gambling house, like all others who make a trade of vice, they may
be prohibited and subjected to severe penalties." Id. at 260 (emphasis added). An
explicit rationale for this distinction is not provided, but most likely it stems from
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Tiedeman discusses at some length why temperance laws were
not only bad policy, but also beyond the state's police power. "[N]o
trade can be subjected to police regulation of any kind," wrote
Tiedeman, "unless its prosecution involves some harm or injury to the
public or to third persons, and in any case the regulation cannot ex-
tend beyond the evil which is to be restrained."'196 Moreover, "no
trade can be prohibited altogether, unless the evil is inherent in the
character of the trade, so that the trade, however conducted, and
whatever may be the character of the person engaged in it, must neces-
sarily produce injury upon the public or upon individual third
persons."
197
After a lengthy examination of the effects of the use and sale of
alcohol, Tiedeman concluded that prohibition was not constitution-
ally justified under the principles of the police power. "IT]he liquor
trade can not ... be prohibited entirely, unless its prosecution is es-
sentially and necessarily injurious to the public. Even the prohibition
of saloons, that is, where intoxicating liquor is sold and served, to be
drunk on the premises, cannot be justified on these grounds." 198 Al-
though the courts of his day rejected this view, Tiedeman contended
that it was "the duty of a constitutional jurist to press his views of con-
stitutional law upon the attention of the legal world, even though they
place him in opposition to the current of authority." 99
Although Tiedeman could not justify the prohibition of the li-
quor trade on private property, he found it different when a state acts
as an owner of property, such as its own offices and buildings, or as
the guardian of public spaces, such as streets and parks. In the latter
instance, it may properly constrain conduct, such as public fornication
or intoxication, that adversely affects other members of the general
public from enjoying its use. Immoral actions like these, though per-
Tiedeman's conception of "public harm." While private vice, of itself, works no nec-
essary harm on the general public, Tiedeman appears to have thought that the busi-
ness of supplying such vices does. He seems not to have understood that the legal
suppression of such business creates enormous harm to the general public.
196 Id. at 301.
197 Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 307.
199 Id. at 311. Thus I believe it is wrong to claim that "Cooley and Tiedeman, with
the characteristic dogmatism of treatise writers, asserted that their views were 'the
law.'" PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MAERtt-s 350 (2000). While Cooley hewed closely to precedent, Tiedeman was a bit
more normative, stating clearly where his views differed with the cases. As a result,
Tiedeman's thesis was somewhat more radical than Cooley's. Of course, both at-
tempted to synthesize "the law" and in so doing emphasized some authorities while
de-emphasizing others.
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mitted behind closed doors, can wrongfully interfere with the use and
enjoyment of the public sphere by reasonable members of the com-
munity and their children. Provided such restrictions on freedom
were shown to be necessary to this end and not violative of some other
constitutional prohibition,200 these sorts of protection of "public
morals" would be within the Lockean construction of the police
power of the states identified here.
On the other hand, were the state allowed the power to prohibit
any purely private activity on the sole ground that a majority of the legis-
lature deems it to be immoral, there would be no limit on state power
since no court could review the rationality of such a judgment. As
between the legislature and a citizen, the legislature would improperly
be the judge in its own case. Imposing so unlimited a power on non-
consenting citizens would be an illegitimate construction of state
power in no way mandated by the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion. "[T]his regulatory power," wrote Bufford, "does not authorize
interference with individual freedom or individual property to protect
individuals from doing injury to themselves, unless consequences
harmful to the public, tend to result."20 1
C. Distinguishing Proper From Improper Exercises of State Power
How can a proper regulation of rightful activity be distinguished
from an improper abridgment of the private rights of the people? As
with federal laws, the key is whether state laws are a pretext for pur-
poses other than the prevention of future or rectification of past
rights violations. "[A] regulation in the exercise of the police power,
to be valid must not be unreasonably or unnecessarily burdensome,
and must have some appreciable tendency towards accomplishing a
result within the scope of police power."20 2 One sign that a law is
pretextual is when it benefits a particular group rather than the gen-
eral public. This type of inquiry was emphasized and developed by
the courts during the Reconstruction and Progressive Eras.
Building on the Lockean idea of the "common good," courts ex-
amined whether a particular law benefited every person in the com-
munity as a whole or whether it instead was implemented for the
benefit of a majority or minority faction (what today would be called a
"special interest" group). As was stated by Justice Bradley in his Slaugh-
200 Laws that improperly discriminate against some class of citizens, for example,
would still be barred by the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
or by the modern interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
201 Bufford, supra note 188, at 276.
202 Id. at 277.
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ter-House dissent: "[F]undamental rights . . . can only be interfered
with... by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good
of all." 203 The paradigm of a law that exceeded the police power to
regulate rightful or prohibit wrongful conduct was a law that, in the
words of Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull, "takes property from
A. and gives it to B"'20 4 or from group A to group B. As explained by
Bufford:
Thus any law which undertakes to abolish personal or property
rights, the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the
rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is
necessary to provide for the public welfare and general security, is
not within the police power, but constitutes an unwarrantable inva-
sion of individual rights.
20 5
"An exercise of legislative powers would be considered valid," ex-
plains Howard Gillman, "only if it could reasonably be justified as con-
tributing to the general welfare. The adjudicative task was to give
meaning to this standard."20 6 Gillman has shown how great effort was
expended by federal and state courts throughout the Progressive Era
to develop sophisticated doctrines by which special interest legislation
could be distinguished from general interest legislation that served a
common good.
Specifically, it came to be determined, first, that laws that singled
out specific groups or classes for special treatment would withstand
constitutional scrutiny only if they could be justified as really related
to the welfare of the community as a whole.., and were not seen as
corrupt attempts to use the powers of government to advance
purely "private" interests... ; and, second, that acts that interfered
with an individual's property or market liberty would be considered
legitimate so long as they were not designed to advance the interests
of just certain groups or classes.
20 7
This project actually originated in state courts decades before the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, when interest groups be-
gan organizing to obtain special benefits from early state legisla-
tures. 20 Policing the vast array of legislative initiatives consistently
from statute to statute was not always easy in a system in which a Su-
preme Court of nine Justices oversaw numerous lower federal and
203 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
204 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted).
205 Bufford, supra note 188, at 275.
206 GILLMAN, supra note 7, at 49.
207 Id. at 49-50.
208 See id. at 45-60.
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state courts comprised of innumerable judges. Gillman demonstrates
that, despite the difficulties of such an inquiry, these efforts were re-
markably coherent and also consistent with the political principles of
the founding generation.
Gillman's important work has two major themes. The first is that
"Lochner Era police powers jurisprudence" was both coherent and
continuous with the underlying principles of the Founding. This
makes the New Deal rejection of this constitutional jurisprudence a
revolution, not a restoration. After this revolution, unless a right
deemed by the Court to be fundamental is violated, "Congress need
not justify intervention itself... need not justify intervening to favor
some participants in the economy over others, and.., need not justify
its choice of favorites." 209 And neither must the states.
Gillman's second theme is that the animating principle of the
"Lochner Era" was an aversion to class legislation, not an adherence
to "laissez-faire." "But 'public purpose' as a limit on the powers of gov-
ernment did not mean 'laissez-faire'; it meant, by and large, class-neu-
tral legislation-legislation that did not impose special burdens or
benefits on certain market competitors. '210 Although Gillman's evi-
dence shows that resistance to class based legislation was undoubtedly
a touchstone by which reasonable regulation was distinguished from
arbitrary interference with liberty, I have two small quarrels with this
last claim.
First, because Gillman misunderstands "laissez-faire," he is re-
jecting a straw man. Laissez-faire was never a claim that liberty could
not be regulated. The writings of Cooley and Tiedeman testify to this.
Therefore, finding that "reasonable" regulations on liberty were up-
held is no evidence that courts were rejecting laissez-faire as a political
end. Courts that are completely committed to laissez-faire would still
uphold reasonable regulations of liberty.
Second, Gillman also underestimates the degree to which the re-
sistance to class based legislation was seen as a means to the protec-
tion of natural rights, rather than an end in itself. That is, the
identification of class based legislation could well have been thought
to be a workable standard or doctrine by which infringements on nat-
ural rights could be detected and corrected. Although Gillman never
really disputes this last point, his continued refrain about the rejection
of laissez-faire in favor of an aversion to class based legislation sets up
an opposition that goes beyond his evidence.
209 Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court's "Return" to Economic Regulation, 1 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 91, 134 (1986).
210 GILLMAN, supra note 7, at 55.
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D. Competing Constructions of the Police Power
Although the Lockean conception of the police power was advo-
cated from the very inception of the Fourteenth Amendment by com-
mentators and jurists seeking to protect the natural liberty rights to
which it referred, other conceptions of the police power existed as
well. In particular, other jurists and commentators claimed a broader
power of states to legislate "in the public interest." To be sure, this
conception need not necessarily be any broader if one conceives of
the respect for individual liberty rights to be essential to the achieve-
ment of a genuinely common good.2 11 Some, however, may see the
protection of individual liberty rights to be more a hindrance than an
aid to pursuing the public good. For such persons, so limited a con-
struction of the police power is objectionable.
Ernst Freund is the scholar most associated with the origins of
this broader conception of the police power. Writing in 1904, Freund
rejected the Lockean conception of a police power defined and lim-
ited by the private "common law rights" of individuals.
But no community confines its care of the public welfare to the en-
forcement of the principles of the common law. The state places its
corporate and proprietary resources at the disposal of the public by
the establishment of improvements and services of different kinds;
and it exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention and antici-
pation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through conven-
tional restraints and positive regulations which are not confined to
the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of state control
which constitutes the essence of the police power. The maxim of
this power is that every individual must submit to such restraints in
the exercise of his liberty or of his rights of property as may be re-
quired to remove or reduce the danger of the abuse of these rights
on the part of those who are unskillful [sic], careless or
unscrupulous.
2 12
Glenn Reynolds and David Kopel summarize the contrast be-
tween this position and that of Tiedeman as follows:
[T]he traditional view, espoused by Tiedman [sic], was that state
power could legitimately be employed to protect individuals from
direct harm; the newer view, represented by Freund, was that the
state could regulate even to prevent harms that might not occur, or
211 This is the thesis of BARNETT, supra note 73.
212 ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
6 (1904) (emphasis omitted).
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that might not have been considered harms at all by the common
law.
2 13
Reynolds and Kopel note, however, that even Freund, "the expositor
of the broad police power theory that dominated legal thought in the
twentieth century, emphasized that judicial review was still essen-
tial."21 4 As Freund put the matter:
Effective judicial limitations on the police power would be impossi-
ble, if the legislature were the sole judge of the necessity of the mea-
sures it enacted .... [T] he maintenance of private rights under the
requirements of the public welfare is a question of proportionate-
ness of measures entirely. Liberty and property yield to the police
power, but not to the point of destruction ....
The question of reasonableness usually resolves itself into this:
Is regulation carried to the point where it becomes a prohibition, de-
struction, or confiscation?
2 15
Kopel and Reynolds present much evidence that Freund's view
was far from the unlimited claim of police power typically posed in
opposition to the views of Cooley and Tiedeman. For example, they
note Freund's endorsement of the propriety of regulating the dispo-
sal of dead bodies as a health and safety measure. Still, writes Freund,
"[p]robably the courts would control legislative discretion were it ex-
ercised in an unreasonable manner. Thus a legislative prohibition of
cremation on the ground that it is contrary to good morals, would not be
likely to be acquiesced in by the courts .... ,,216 Freund acknowledged
that the legislature could not be the sole judge of its own powers. "Yet
if the passage of a statute were conclusive evidence of the existence of
the danger and of the necessity of the remedy, the power of the legis-
lature in the most important field of the police power would be practi-
cally unrestricted. ' 217 Thus even into the twentieth century, the
police power had not been construed to be an unlimited power, con-
strained only by the express prohibitions of the Constitution.
Moreover, the expanded view of the police power in the early
twentieth century was sometimes conceded, by some who supported
this expansion, to be in conflict with the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. For example, we find Collins Denny, Jr., of
Princeton, writing in the Michigan Law Review in praise of Justice
Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House.
213 Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observa-
tions for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 512 (2000).
214 Id. at 517.
215 FREUND, supra note 212, at 60-61 (emphasis added).
216 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
217 Id. at 134.
2004]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The judges were sympathetic with the results of the war in so far as
they established the principles of territorial sovereignty, but were
not ready to see the states become powerless and the whole theory
of our Constitution destroyed. Fortunate indeed were we in having
such a man as Justice Miller, who in time of great national distur-
bance was able to foresee the inherent danger of this new amend-
ment, and who had the courage to place himself in the path of
radicalism and check it.
... This decision rendered valueless the 'privileges and [sic] immu-
nities' clause in extending the national power at the expense of that
of the states.
2 18
Denny explicitly praises Miller for deviating from the original
meaning of the text: "The dissenting judges undoubtedly interpreted
this amendment as the framers of it had intended."2 19 Lest one specu-
late about the reason for disregarding and "render[ing] valueless" a
portion of the Constitution's text as too "radical," Denny makes it ex-
plicit in a truly stunning passage: "It has been very fortunate for [the
South] that the Supreme Court has given the police power such a
wide range, and due to this power the South has so far been able to
ward off the danger arising from her large negro population."
2 20
Although an unlimited plenary police power is favored because it
can be used for good, it can also be used for ill. Hastings saw a simi-
lar origin of the broader claim of police power although, unlike
Denny, he strongly disapproved. After the Civil War, he observed, the
police power was "needed ... to enable the states to maintain their
autonomy against the reconstruction legislation of Congress and the
new amendments."
2 21
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment stands as a
barrier by which those against whom the police power is used can seek
to defend themselves in Congress and in the courts. So too does the
original conception of the police power that evolved alongside the
amendment. As Hastings wrote, the police power "appears clearly
enough from our decisions, a branch of constitutional law peculiar to
countries having legislatures with limited power. It is an outgrowth of
the American conception of protecting the individual from the state.
218 Denny, supra note 152, at 190-92.
219 Id. at 191 n.46.
220 Id. at 201.
221 Hastings, supra note 165, at 550 (emphasis added).
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It originated in connection with the discussion of the limitation on
the legislative powers of the states under our federal system."
222
CONCLUSION
We can sum up this analysis of the police power of states as fol-
lows: The Fourteenth Amendment does not bar states from prohibit-
ing wrongful exercises of freedom. There is no privilege to violate the
rights of others, nor any immunity from liability should one do so. In
nearly all instances, the Constitution leaves the general power to pro-
hibit wrongful conduct where it was before its ratification: in the
hands of states. It does, however, give Congress the power to prohibit
and set the punishment for certain identifiable offenses, such as trea-
son and piracy. The powers that came to be called the "police power"
of the state are far from being inconsistent with the rights retained by
the people. To the contrary, properly construed, the protection of
individual rights is at the core of a state's police power.
A state may alsojustify its laws by showing that it is merely regulat-
ing liberty in a way that protects the rights of others. The Fourteenth
Amendment bars states from "abridging" or violating the privileges or
immunities of citizenship. It does not bar them from subjecting these
privileges to publicly accessible "standing rules" of law, provided that
such rules are also shown to be necessary to protect the rights that
everyone possesses. In this manner, although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bars the abridgment of liberty and permits liberty-restricting
laws to be challenged in federal court, it does not prevent legislatures
from reasonably regulating the exercise of private rights.
Finally, in addition to prohibiting wrongful and regulating right-
ful private behavior that may injure the rights of others, the state may
also manage government controlled public space so as to enable
members of the public to enjoy its use, and may restrict the use of its
own property provided these regulations and restrictions do not im-
properly violate other constitutional prohibitions on state power.
All these principles are illustrated nicely by the decision in Law-
rence v. Texas,22 3 in which the Supreme Court struck down a state stat-
ute criminalizing sexual conduct-or "sodomy"-between persons of
the same sex. Although Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, did
not explicitly employ the view of the police power identified here, his
opinion could be interpreted as implicitly doing so. He does not find
222 Id. at 360.
223 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). I discuss the Lawrence case at greater length in Randy
E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATo
SuP. CT. REV. 21.
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the prohibited conduct to be the exercise of a "fundamental right" of
privacy calling for strict scrutiny of the statute. Instead, his opinion
rests entirely on the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
"We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution." 224 The bulk of the opinion
is taken up defending the characterization of conduct in question as
liberty rather than as license:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres
of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes free-
dom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and
more transcendent dimensions.
225
Having defined the conduct as liberty, Justice Kennedy then re-
quires the state to have a legitimate reason for interfering with its ex-
ercise. The only reason offered by the government in its defense is
that the legislature deemed the conduct to be immoral, a justification
Justice Kennedy found to be inadequate: "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as im-
moral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack."226
The decision in Lawrence implicitly rejects the view of the police
power as unlimited and plenary and is entirely compatible with the
analysis presented here. The defendants in this case were exercising
their unenumerated right, or liberty, to use their bodies as they chose.
Because their activity, performed entirely behind closed doors, did
not wrongfully interfere with the equal rights of others to their per-
sons or property, it is properly characterized as liberty, as opposed to
licence. By prohibiting the rightful exercise of liberty, the statute ex-
ceeds the proper scope of the police power.
Although the state could possibly regulate, as opposed to pro-
hibit, a rightful exercise of liberty, such a regulation would have to be
224 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (emphasis added).
225 Id. at 2475 (emphases added).
226 Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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shown to be necessary to the protection of the rights of others. For
example, the state might say that if you are to engage in such conduct,
it must not be done in a public place where members of the general
public might view it. A bare assertion that the conduct in question is
immoral is inadequate, however, since such an assertion could always
be made, potentially justifying any regulation or prohibition. Such a
construction exceeds the proper scope of the police power because it
violates the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment-the liberty that, due to the Slaughter-House Cases, is now
protected instead by the Due Process Clause.
By the theory of the police power presented here, Lawrence v.
Texas is, therefore, an easy case. Any effort to identify the proper
scope of the police power of states requires either Congress or the
courts to draw a line between permissible and impermissible justifica-
tions for prohibition and regulation of individual conduct. Though
any effort to draw lines will sometimes be vexatious, Lawrence illus-
trates how it can also be quite straightforward. Whether hard or easy,
however, the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
rules out the unlimited or plenary conception of state power and
mandates that states justify any restrictions on the actions of their citi-
zens as within the proper scope of the police power.
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